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ABSTRACT 
My thesis investigates six cases of censorship of the television lakorn, Thailand’s 
version of the soap opera, from 2005 to the present. The primetime lakorn is consistently 
being watched by a quarter to a third of the nation, making it the programming with the 
farthest reach. These cases of censorship contend with issues of queer visibility, feminine 
desires, gender roles, family values, political authority, and corruption. I explore the 
censorship of lakorn as operating at an interface because it does not adhere to the rhetoric 
of censorship as the strict state prohibition of certain images and discourses pre-coded in 
official policies. The Thai state is neither the initiator nor authoritative decision-maker in 
these acts of censoring. Lakorn censorship is instead a process in which the interface 
serves as a physical and virtual space of interaction, mediation and negotiation. This 
process is ongoing since it does not begin nor cease with an external decision from a state 
board of censors and conditional since it depends on a substantial public reaction.  
 My study does not disregard the role of the state; rather it problematizes the extent 
and nature of that role and its inconsistencies. While the state never initiates censorship, 
it is always involved and implicated in varying extents. Lakorn censorship does not 
confirm the existence of a monolithic Thai state with the exclusive right to control 
broadcasting, but rather a state in conversation with others. Thus, the censor interface 
serves as a discursive site where interest groups, state bodies, channel executives and 
concerned individuals encounter each another to discuss, debate, and deliberate a wide 
range of pertinent issues. My thesis is a study of contemporary Thai popular culture in 
motion. Due to its mainstream appeal and soap genre conventions, the lakorn is the 
medium capable of breaching the fantasy/reality and public/private divides. Censorship is 
 
 
 
the lens through which to examine the dynamic relationship between the institution of 
law, lawmakers and citizens. Finally, lakorn spectators, both fanatics and critics, are the 
drivers of cultural change through their participation at the censor interface. 
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Introduction 
Policing a Cherished Pastime:  
Intersections within Soap Censorship in Thailand 
 
The Thai Soap 
The contemporary landscape of primetime television in Thailand is a vibrant realm of high 
commercialism. Since its birth in the 1950s, terrestrial television has grown into the most 
accessible media form in the country today. Its prominence indicates the growing influence of the 
small screen on Thai popular culture. There are three types of television programming 
distinguished according to content. The first category is non-fiction or journalist which includes 
news, documentaries, and live coverage of current events. The second group is characterized as 
light entertainment to refer to game and quiz shows, talk shows, reality TV, and variety shows. 
Finally, the third type is fiction or dramatic which encompasses programming that requires acting 
such as the drama special, series, the sit-com (situational comedy) and the daytime and evening 
soap opera.1 Within this television mediascape, the primetime lakorn (ละครโทรทศัน์) as Thailand’s 
soap opera, is the most watched form of programming. Accessible through three free-to-air 
channels - Channel 3, 5 and 7 - and on the cable channel, True Visions, as of 2011, the lakorn 
garners a combined domestic audience of around 17 to 20 million on a nightly basis. The 1994 
remake of Dao Pra Sook (ดาวพระศกุร์ - Ch.7) is one of the most beloved and well-known television 
shows in Thai history. The 2008 lakorn, Kom Faek (คมแฝก - Ch. 7), was watched by a quarter of 
the nation. The immense popularity of Raeng Ngao (แรงเงา - Ch.3) temporarily cleared the streets 
of Bangkok in late 2012. The Thai soap opera therefore gains this heightened status as the most 
popular visual medium of entertainment. 
                                                          
1 ArjarnRT, “Toratat…mi raay kaan praphet arai bang? [Television…has what types of programming?],” RT201’s 
Blog, September 13, 2009, accessed April 20, 2014 <http://www.oknation.net/blog/rt201dpu/2009/09/13/entry-1>. 
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The lakorn is situated in a borderline space. By the nature of its genre, it is a serialized 
narrative that blends melodrama and realism. Due to its commercialization, it is designed for a 
mainstream audience wherein its content should be as neutral and intelligible as possible. Unlike 
other mediums of visual spectacle, it is a cherished pastime enjoyed mostly in the comforts of 
home, yet it is discussed about in public locations and often as public knowledge. Its nightly, 
nationwide primetime broadcast gives it such high accessibility. The lakorn also gains this 
currency with its audiences as the most prominent medium of imaginary world-making against 
which to test their own understandings and conceptions. When controversial issues are depicted in 
lakorn, their making of a fictitious world is being compared to the circumstances and conditions 
of the real world by its viewers. Thus, owing to its commercialized form, mainstream appeal and 
melodramatic character, the lakorn is able to unsettle the divide between fantasy and reality and 
public and private. 
As such, the lakorn can very well act as a distinct marker and maker of its viewers’ shifting 
configurations of desires, anxieties, curiosities and complacencies. Acknowledging the ability of 
the lakorn to infiltrate the intimate lives of its spectators is to recognize it not merely as a private 
outlet of daily entertainment but also a public spokesperson. It works as a powerful visual vessel 
of Thai ethos and values. Censorship then emerges alongside the contentions and contestations 
surrounding the validity and appropriateness of on-screen representations. Soap censorship in 
Thailand is an elaborate and perplexing operation that comprises of an extended network of state 
regulatory bodies such as the Ministry of Culture and the National Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Commission claiming to follow a legible system of evaluating and censoring 
lakorn content deemed inappropriate, inaccurate or inciting. But these state agencies often act more 
as moderators than as the initiators of a call for censorship. In this thesis, I argue that the visual 
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space of lakorn serves as the battleground on which various interests groups – parents, religious 
organizations, trade unions, fans, and even the creators themselves - also vehemently fight over 
the right to control what can and cannot be seen, what should and should be known.  
The Censor Interface 
In her study on film censorship in Britain, Annette Kuhn reminds us that many censorship 
studies often start out with existing assumptions about where censorship occurs and about its 
outcomes. These assumptions are grounded in the prohibition/institutions model wherein 
censorship is understood as an act of prohibition, excision or “cutting out” which renders the 
censored text as partial or distorted in its representation. This model also “constructs censorship 
as an activity guided by practices of exclusion, and locates those practices in organizations such 
as boards of film censors, or institutions whose activities impinge directly upon those of censorship 
bodies.”2 In framing any kind of censorship as a prohibitive activity conducted with a self-
contained and predefined set of institutions, the prohibition model takes censorship as a given and 
reifies it. This definition is a constricting one which allows for only one story to be told. Such 
studies of censorship merely retell “official” institutional histories in their reiteration and 
summation of organizational and governmental policies that impose restrictions on film. This 
model, Kuhn warns, conceptualizes censorship as an authoritative, one-time action levied onto a 
passive, inert object. It isolates censorship practices from their broader social and historical 
conditions of existence. More importantly, the assumption that censorship only prohibits or 
represses neglects the fact that censorship might be equally productive in its effects.3  
It is a truism to say that television censorship is a mode of state control and prohibition in 
Thailand. After all, the regulation of televised images, like speech and expression, is usually 
                                                          
2 Annette Kuhn, Cinema, Censorship and Sexuality (New York: Routledge, 1988), 8, 2. 
3 Kuhn, 3-4. 
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codified in official legislation. But heeding Kuhn’s warning, my study of censorship avoids 
relaying an institutional history of the policing bodies of lakorn. I explore formal legals codes and 
broadcasting regulations only to contextualize censorship within the social and political conditions 
that frame its emergence and enforcement. The conventional definition under the 
prohibition/institution model when applied to the Thai context mistakenly treats censorship as a 
unilateral application of a comprehensive set of policies already coded by a unitary agency in 
charge. But lakorn censorship is not always the overt imposition of state power. Cultural aphasia 
as “the willed inability within a culture to allow for the articulation of certain ideas” is pronounced 
in Thailand. Topics that are taboo such as the monarchy, prostitution, and the Sangha or that reflect 
poorly on the Thai nation are refuted or outright denied by state authorities. State encouragement 
of this “national will not to know” puts great pressure on people to conduct themselves 
accordingly.4 The censorship of lakorn is not simply the maintenance of these “discursive voids” 
through the consistent barring of an exhaustive list of immoral, sexist, racist, or violent topics. 
Rather, censorship is a bargaining process in which the state is not always present but the idea of 
the state is always operating. I argue that the constant reminder of the state, manifested in the 
looming threat of its sanctions for misbehavior and saying “the unspeakable”, also works to govern 
and discipline its citizens. 
In this thesis, I trace the intersections of soap censorship through an examination of the 
interactions between the censors, the spectators and the medium itself. I discover that it does not 
translate merely as the imposition of state policy and rules. Censorship, in every case, is a mediated 
process wherein different groups of people meet literally and figuratively to negotiate conflicting 
sets of demands. Therefore, my thesis is an investigation into the impetuses, practices, rationales, 
                                                          
4 Peter Jackson, “The Thai Regime of Images,” Sojourn 19.2 (2004): 192. He draws from the work of Bishop and 
Robinson (1998). 
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relations and powers involved in a continual interaction at a censor interface. An interface 
materializes when a point of connection ties together two independent concepts, systems, or 
bodies. The interface exists as a common space where contact and communication between 
conflicting or incompatible things are possible. The lakorn anchors the Thai censor interface to 
connect the state with the public.  The censor interface serves as an intermediary and synchronizer 
of the differing opinions between these two sides over control over access to information and 
knowledge. The censor interface is tasked with the responsibility of harmonizing the concerns of 
the state over the lakorn and the demands of the people who watch it. It acts as the arbitrator of 
statecraft and spectatorship. It is supposed to settle matters in order for the two sides to coexist. 
Being at the Thai censor interface entails exploring the various junctures where its parts - the 
lakorn, its spectators, and policing bodies - intertwine. This exploration will produce a telling view 
of the capability of the lakorn to confront, address, and even alter societal norms and expectations. 
Thesis Outline 
This thesis will detail the history, practice and controversy of lakorn censorship in 
Thailand. My interest and research on this topic comes from my personal experience as an avid 
watcher of lakorn starting from when I first started learning the Thai language seven years ago. I 
also draw heavily on three bodies of literature: soap studies, censorship studies and entertainment 
news articles to account for the three aspects included in my title: the lakorn, its spectatorship and 
policing bodies. My study examines instances in which the lakorn brings into the spotlight 
underlying tensions and frictions within Thai conventions about sex and gender roles and political 
expression. Although other controversial issues such as poverty, social hierarchy, the urban bias, 
prostitution, and ethnic minorities are often addressed on-screen, I did not directly or fully 
investigate them because they have yet to trigger a major case of censorship. Finally, I focus my 
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thesis on lakorn from 2005 to the present with one exception since the censor interface as a space 
of interaction and negotiation only emerged at a time when spectators have a variety of channels 
of protest to voice their call for or criticism of censorship.  
Chapter 1 will explore the commercial success of the lakorn in primetime Thai television. 
It details the development of the genre in the country with comparisons to its counterparts in the 
U.S., Britain and Latin America. It discusses the core characteristics of the lakorn in terms of its 
formulaic configuration, high predictability and commercialization. Chapter 2 outlines the 
establishment of the main state agencies responsible for monitoring broadcasting in general. The 
government has long legitimized television censorship, erecting a formidable mountain of legal 
backing. State censorship demonstrates the unease felt by influential political figures about the 
power of television to shape public thinking. This chapter will also explain the mechanisms, phases 
and temporality of lakorn censorship in particular to distinguish it from the censorship of other 
types of programming and mediums. While this chapter emphasizes the state legislation and 
policies involved in the censorship process, it is intended to illustrate how law is utilized to 
reconfigure and reconstitute social, political and power relations between the state, television 
media producers and its consumers. The first half of this thesis aims to demonstrate how the 
supposed make-believe world of lakorn is also subjected to censorship because of its potential as 
the most watched medium to enflame public opinion, destroy the sense of morality, and smear the 
purity of Thai identity. 
Chapter 3 focuses on recent cases of lakorn censorship in which sex and gender paradigms 
were being tested at the interface. The censorship of queer representations manifests not in their 
prohibition or omission, but in their prominent but neutralized incorporation into the lakorn. The 
censorship of feminine desires occurs when soaps were targeted for their salacious and gratuitous 
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display of the sexual behavior of female character(s) who clearly challenged Thai patriarchal 
conventions. The negotiation between different groups at the censor interface assessed prevailing 
conceptions of proper gender roles and propriety only to end up reaffirming them. Chapter 4 
analyzes several incidents in which a lakorn was banned for its political connotations and tacit 
references. This chapter focuses on the most infamous case of censorship: the self-imposed ban of 
Nuer Mek 2 by Channel 3 in early 2013. The politicized debate surrounding the mysterious content 
of the last few episodes and reason behind the abrupt termination shows how the political 
objectivity of lakorn and its spectatorship are no longer givens. The aftermath of this incident was 
quite productive in fueling gripes and disagreements, proving that debates about censorship are 
not entirely resolved with one decision. The second half of the thesis aims to show how law and 
the state frame but rarely determine the need for censorship. It also expands and complicates the 
notion of lakorn spectatorship. On one hand, it demonstrates how the petition for censorship by 
harsh critics of lakorn is also part and parcel of spectatorship. On the other, while viewers can 
request for censorship, they can just as easily protest against it. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes with 
a fascinating account of the shifting interplay between the lakorn as medium, the interpretative 
work of its fan(atic)s and the strategies of its policing bodies.  
In this study, I argue that the television lakorn serves as the favored medium and 
mechanism through which to reevaluate social norms and their applicability to an ever-changing 
Thai society. Despites its primary role as a source of reaction and entertainment, the lakorn 
possesses a valuable productive potential. It serves as an outlet to address real issues such as the 
pillars of the Thai family, reexamine social realities such as the status of queer individuals, reflect 
on lived experiences such as the role of modern Thai women, and expose acute problems such as 
a corrupt government. Bitter struggles are staged at a censor interface where contestations between 
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producers, spectators and the state over the “correct” representation of sexuality, gender roles, 
religious authenticity, political expression, and cultural identity are being played out. It is the 
lakorn, in its breaching of the demarcation between fiction and reality and public and private, 
which brings this out in such a spectacular manner in every sense of the word. The story of the 
audience reception of the lakorn and the state and non-state efforts to regulate its content will be 
an engaging plotline in and of itself, one filled with conflicts, chaos and of course, plenty of drama. 
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Chapter 1 
Basking in the Limelight: 
The Success of the Lakorn in Primetime Television 
 
The soap opera today is distinguishable as one of television’s oldest drama forms. Its great 
success at reaping audience loyalty around the world is irrefutable. Its genius at fashioning an 
imaginary world of melodramatic splendor is wholly entertaining. The soap opera originated in 
the United States in the 1930s when soap producers such as Colgate and Palmolive sponsored 
weekday serial narratives broadcasted first on radio. The soap opera was transferred to a televised 
form as television industries in the U.S., Britain and Brazil gained momentum. The contemporary 
soap is now a global genre in that it is a narrative mode produced in many countries and it is the 
most exported form of television viewed in a range of cultural contexts.5 The soap has mass appeal 
and marketability with today’s viewing audiences. From its American origins, the soap opera has 
skyrocketed into a worldwide guilty pleasure. The soap has even carved out its own place in the 
discipline of television studies. What makes it so special? What makes it so addictive? More 
importantly, what makes it so lethal? 
The early years of the soap opera can attest to how far it has come. The first American soap 
operas during the Depression years were radio serials that overtly targeted married women since 
the episodes were interspersed with commercials for health, beauty and household products. The 
British soap opera came next when BBC radio aired its first in 1941. When this serial form was 
introduced to American television in the 1950s, the soap was marketed to TV audiences as a low-
budget, daytime programming targeting female viewers who worked at home. The wild success of 
Dallas (CBS, 1978-1991) then commenced the reign of the primetime American supersoap. With 
                                                          
5 Chris Barker, “Global Soaps and Global News,” Global Television: An Introduction (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers Inc., 1997), 75. 
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its glitz, high production value, and long-running daily programming, newcomers such as Knots 
Landing (CBS, 1979-1993), Dynasty (ABC, 1981-1989), and Falcon Crest (1981-1990) gained 
cult status as primetime TV soaps. British television followed with Eastenders (BBC1, 1985-) and 
Neighbours (BBC1, 1986-2008).6 The soap opera has grown alongside the development of 
television in these two countries. By the 1990s, the soap opera was no longer taken lightly. It had 
transcended the realm of women’s programming into a television heavyweight. 
Since the birth of television in Thailand, the lakorn as the Thai version of the soap opera 
has also climbed its way up the broadcasting ladder for its mass appeal. Due to its high viewership 
accumulated over the decades, the lakorn is now the topic of daily conservations in living rooms, 
universities, and coffee shops across the country. The lakorn, at first glance, seems too silly and 
inconsequential to be a serious issue of investigation. To consider the lakorn solely as a 
commercial gimmick, however, is to disregard its role beyond the TV screen in shaping everyday 
lives. The lakorn compiles an amalgam of elements that tailor to Thai viewers and has more 
recently caught the interest of various audiences abroad. Despite its penchant for the sensational, 
the lakorn provides viewers with more than just a few laughs and tears. It is a powerhouse of 
contemporary Thai popular culture. Before understanding how the lakorn can provoke the censors, 
it is crucial to locate the foundations of its popularity. This chapter focuses on the rise of the lakorn 
in Thai primetime television by exploring its essence, both its parallels to and digressions from 
popular soap genres worldwide. It maps out the production, the narrative, the allure, and the 
afterlife of the Thai soap opera in order to illustrate how it has become such a prized commodity 
for fans and television executives. 
 
                                                          
6 Trisha Dunleavy, “Serial Melodrama: The Soap Opera,” Television Drama: Form, Agency, Innovation (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 101-102. 
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The Birth of Television 
Thai television was born in 1950 under the Department of Propaganda. Along with radio 
broadcast inaugurated earlier in 1930, the army had a firm grip on the airwaves in these early days 
of broadcasting.7 In 1955, Thailand became the first country in Asia to provide a regular television 
service. The first television station was set up on June 24, 1955 under the name of the Thai 
Television Company, a public enterprise under the Public Relations Department, to operate 
Channel 4. Three years later, the Ministry of National Defense opened the second station, Channel 
5, as a public relations tool for the army.8 In 1967, another Royal Army project launched the first 
color television station, Channel 7, under the name of the Bangkok Broadcasting and Television 
Company. The Thai Television Company followed in 1970 by broadcasting in color on Channel 9 
alongside the black-white system on Channel 4. That same year, Channel 3 was established and 
operated by the Bangkok Entertainment Group. In 1977, the Thai Television Company was shut 
down in favor of establishing the Mass Communications Organization of Thailand (MCOT), a 
state enterprise under the Office of Prime Minister, to operate only Channel 9 from then on.9 
Within two decades, television quickly emerged as the new frontier of national development. The 
government, army, and private sector were vying with each other for the right to operate one or 
more channels in hopes of benefiting from its future capacity to reach the population at large.  
The competition between these three parties may have fueled the rapid development of 
television in the country. The initial onset of television programming in the country did not posed 
much threat to the film industry since it was relatively expensive to produce and disseminate in 
                                                          
7 Pirongrong Ramasoota Rananand, “Reforms and Self-Regulation,” in Between the Tiger and the Crocodile: 
Broadcast Media Self-Regulation in Southeast Asia (Bangkok, Thailand: Southeast Asian Press Alliance, 2004), 100. 
8 Paradee Kiatpinyochai, “The Thai Television Broadcasting Industry: Its Economics & Politics” (MA thesis, 
Thammasat University, 1990), 9, 13. 
9 Paradee, 16-17, 21-24. 
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the infancy years. Only several thousand television sets were imported mainly to urban, upper-
class Thai households. By 1975, there were only about 685,000 households with television, mostly 
in the Central Region of the country. However, when national broadcast was made available in 
1979, a substantial number of upcountry households gained access.10 By 1986, with dropping 
costs, the number of households owning a TV set increased significantly. About 80% of urban 
families and 40% of rural families had one set.11 The growing accessibility of television drastically 
changed the composition of mass media. Half of advertising expenditure for this decade went to 
television alone while the combined expenditure from radio, newspaper, magazine and cinema 
made up the other half.12 Since all TV stations eventually became commercial, the main criterion 
for selecting programs was its potential for mass appeal. Variety shows and imported U.S. 
television series were popular with adults while the children enjoyed U.S. and Japanese cartoons 
as well as local programs specially made for them. Sport programs, particularly local and foreign 
soccer matches, international tennis tournaments and even U.S. football, basketball and boxing 
bouts also had wide appeal. But the Office of the Prime Minister noted that the most popular 
programs were the locally produced serial or lakorn (toratat).13 The 1980s was a phenomenal 
decade of growth for Thai television, paving the way for the soap to dominate primetime 
entertainment. In 1994, the National Statistics Office reported that 47 million people out of a 
population of 57 million have been watching television regularly since they were six years old.14 
                                                          
10 Sara Van Fleet, “Everyday Dramas; Television and Modern Thai Women” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 
1998), 205-206. 
11 Patsorn Sungsri, Thai National Cinema: The Three Potent Signifiers of Thai Identity, Nation, Religion and 
Monarchy, their Interrelationship and Influence in Thai National Cinema (Saarbrucken, Germany: VDM Verlag Dr. 
Muller, 2008), 115-116.  
12 Paradee, 1. 
13 Office of the Prime Minister Royal Thai Government, Thailand in the 80s (Bangkok: Thai Watana Panich Press Co. 
Ltd., 1979), 139-14. 
14 Van Fleet, 206.  
For more on the development of television: “Prawat toratat nai prathet thai [The history of television in Thailand],” 
RT201’s Blog, July 5, 2009, accessed February 20, 2014 <http://oknation.net/blog/rt201dpu/2009/07/05/entry-2>. 
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The composition of the industry today indicates that the main players in broadcasting are 
its regulators – the MCOT and PRD – the army, and the operators from the private sector. 
Currently, Thailand has six free-to-air terrestrial television stations that are directly or indirectly 
owned by state agencies: Channel 5 and 7 under the Royal Thai Army, Channel 3 and 9 under the 
MCOT, and Channel 11 under the National Broadcasting Service of Thailand and Thai TBS, 
owned by the government through the Public Relations Department. There is one subscription 
cable service under a satellite network, TrueVisions.15 Essentially, Thai television industry 
operates under a dual system in which the state is the legal owner of all radio and television stations 
but allocates the daily control and management to commercial enterprises.16 Then and now, being 
a main stakeholder in the television industry implies a position of great privilege and entitlement. 
It guarantees the upper-hand in the quest to conquer national airwaves. It secures a flowing influx 
of profits in the commercialization of televised broadcasting. Most importantly, it means the power 
to carve out a specific message that could be disseminated to the masses.  
Station Launch 
Year 
Official Name Operations 
License 
Owner 
Channel 3 1970 Bangkok Entertainment Group 
(TV3) 
Concession MCOT 
Channel 5 1958 Royal Thai Army Television 
(RTA TV-5) 
Ownership Royal Thai Army 
Channel 7 1967 Bangkok Broadcasting and 
Television Company (BBTV-7) 
Concession Royal Thai Army 
Channel 9 1955 Modernine TV Ownership MCOT 
Channel 11 1988 National Broadcasting Service  
of Thailand (NBT) 
Ownership Public Relations 
Department 
Channel 29 2008 Thai Public Broadcasting 
Service (Thai PBS) 
Ownership Government and 
the Public 
TrueVisions 1998 TrueVisions (cable satellite) Ownership True Corporation 
Table 1.1: The current ownership and management of national television networks in Thailand 
                                                          
15 Somkiat Onwimon, “TV’s Elusive Dream,” in Between the Tiger and the Crocodile: Broadcast Media Self-
Regulation in Southeast Asia (Bangkok, Thailand: Southeast Asian Press Alliance, 2004), 53. 
16 Ubonrat Siriyuvasak, “The Development of a Participatory Democracy: Raison D’etre for Media Reform in 
Thailand,” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Sciences 22 (1994): 106. 
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On Center Stage 
 
In the first year of television broadcasting, dramatic productions consisted mainly of taped 
versions of stage theatre. Thailand’s first production written specifically for television was a lakorn 
titled Suriyanee Refuses to Marry (สรุยิานีไมย่อมแตง่งาน). It was a live performance airing on 
Channel 4 on January 4, 1956 and was an instant success. There were five productions in this first 
year, 46 in the following year, and 100 in the year after that.17 Stage play actors dominated lakorn 
live productions in this pioneer age of television. Soon, Channel 7 also began to produce its own 
lakorn. The lakorn progressed quickly from a stage performance where the actors are fed lines 
periodically to one in which they had to memorize and recite the lines themselves. Pre-recorded 
soaps made it onto the scene in 1976. In 1981, at the urging of the National Telecommunications 
Committee, soaps began airing in primetime slot after the evening news (around 8:30-10:30pm), 
which continues today.18 Benefitting from the television boom, the 1990s witnessed the 
proliferation of lakorn production, signaling a golden age of television. AGB Nielsen started 
measuring ratings for Thai television industry in the greater Bangkok area in 1980. By 1997, TV 
ratings were measured and reported nationally.19 The Thai lakorn had fully come into its own. 
Many of the most well-beloved soaps came out during this decade, most of which have been 
remade: Koo Gum (คูก่รรม - Ch.7, 1990), Wanida (วนิดา - Ch.3, 1991), Si Pan Din (สีแ่ผน่ดนิ - 
Ch.3, 1992) Tawipop (ทวภิพ - Ch.7, 1994), and Dao Pra Sook (ดาวพระศกุร์ - Ch.7, 1994).20  
                                                          
17 Van Fleet, 209-210. 
18 Pornchai Sereemongkonpol, “Lakorn love,” Bangkok Post, June 21, 2013. 
19 “Thailand,” AGB Nielsen Media Research, accessed February 15, 2014  
<http://www.agbnielsen.net/whereweare/dynPage.asp?lang=english&id=243&country=Thailand>.  
AGB Nielsen Media Research measures domestic viewership with a rating system based on a number scale that 
corresponds to the percentage of the population who tuned in. Their system equates each rating interval with one 
percent of the national population as indicated from the most current census. A rating of 10 (10%) in 2010 will reflect 
a higher number of viewers than the same exact rating in 2000 since the population size has increased. 
20 “Lap luang phrang lakorn thai (jop): Sin ‘Silapa’ suuyuk ‘Thorikit’ [The secret deception and disguise of the Thai 
drama (end): The end of ‘art’ onto the era of ‘business’].” AST Manager, July 4, 2009, accessed January 25, 2014 
 <http://www.manager.co.th/Entertainment/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9520000063043>. 
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Illustration 1.1: One of Thailand’s most popular lakorn of all time, Dao Pra Sook, starring Num 
Sornram Thippitek (left) and Kob Suvanant Kongying (right) 
 
The 2000s cemented the status of the lakorn as a rating machine. Similar to the telenovela 
industry, the Thai lakorn industry generates a star system that permeates into almost every other 
aspect of the entertainment industry.21 Lakorn stars today gain fame and fortune through their work 
in multiple soaps which springboard their entry into music, film, magazine shoots, promotional 
appearances and advertisements. Four out of the five highest paid male Thai celebrity are lakorn 
actors. The top five on the female side are all lakorn actresses.22 With the explosion of the internet, 
viewers were also tuning in online. Numerous fanclubs, websites, and forums were popping up all 
over cyberspace. In 2008, Channel 7’s Kom Faek (คมแฝก) scored the highest viewership rating of 
all time with around 15 million viewers. In 2010, then Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva attended 
                                                          
21 Van Fleet, 221. 
22 “Aum-Nadech Dara Kha Tua Phaeng Kae Khrung Pii Ru Nia [Aum-Nadech, the appearance fees of celebrities are 
expensive. Is this just from half the year?],” Sanook! Webboard, July 12, 2012, accessed January 29, 2014 
<http://webboard.sanook.com/forum/?topic=3621390>.  
The fifth highest paid male Thai celebrity is Ananda Everingham, a well-known film actor, who is set to debut in his 
first lakorn role in 2015. 
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the 16th Asian Games in Guangzhou and together with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jia Bao signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding to start televising popular Thai soaps on China Central 
Television (CCTV8) and local stations, which draw up to 700-800 million viewers.23 The same 
year, Channel 3 celebrated its 40th anniversary with a large-scale project that introduced the multi-
series lakorn. Channel 3 aired a 4-part production, 4 Hua Jai Haeng Khun Khao (4 หวัใจแหง่ขนุเข), 
back to back with each story standing on its own but related to its predecessor(s). Two years later, 
satellite channel TrueVisions produced its first primetime lakorn as part of its True Asian Series. 
The inaugural program was Coffee Prince (คอฟฟ่ีปรนิซ์ ไทย), which was followed by Endless Love 
(รกัน้ีช ั่วนิรนัดร์) a year later. Currently, viewers can watch lakorn every day of the week on Channel 
3, 5, 7, and TrueVisions. With today’s technology, audiences anywhere can consume up to 85 
daytime and primetime lakorn airing within a year. 
The production of the Thai lakorn runs on a commercial engine. It has eclipsed the film 
and music industry in terms of lucrativeness. Following the making, marketing and reception of 
the 2013 version of Koo Gum (คูก่รรม or Ill-Fated Lovers) helps to sketch out the modern life of 
the lakorn. Originally a historical romance novel by Thommayanti, the story has been interpreted 
three times in film and six times in television. This particular 2013 remake coincides with the 
release of a full-length mainstream film version.24 The lakorn version, produced by Exact, aired 
on Channel 5 for a total of 24 episodes from January to April. Set during World War II, Koo Gum 
follows a young woman named Angsumalin, a proud Thai nationalist, who joins the resistance 
forces against Japanese occupation of Siam. She meets Kobori, a cheerful young captain in the 
                                                          
23 “Thailand: Thai soaps to serve Chinese audiences,” Asia News Monitor, November 8, 2010. 
24 Thommayanti (ทมยนัตี) (real name: Wimon Chiamcharoen, วมิล เจียมเจรญิ) is also known for another work, 
Tawipop, a historical romance fantasy novel. Sunset at Chaophraya (2013) starred Nadech Kugimiya as Kobori 
and Oranate D.Caballes as Angsumalin (Hideko). Although the film did poorly in theatres, recovering slighty more 
than half of its 80 million baht budget, Nadech recently won the TopPics award for best lead actor in a film for 2013. 
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Imperial Japanese Navy, but keeps him at a distance due to her involvement with the movement 
and her feelings for a childhood friend. Forced by political circumstances, she marries Kobori only 
in name and continues to secretly help free her country. Koo Gum is a tragic story of Angsumalin’s 
struggle to accept Kobori’s unconditional love without compromising her patriotism.25 
 
Illustration 1.2: Promotional poster for the 2013 remake of Koo Gum featuring Bie Sukrit and 
Noona Nuengthida 
Usually, the channels intermittently announce their upcoming projects, conducts a short 
internal casting call, and posts the cast list and a short synopsis on their website shortly before 
filming begins. In the case of Koo Gum, the media hype was a bit different. In mid-2011, rumors 
were circulating that there would soon be another remake of Koo Gum set for production in the 
coming year. Subscribers to Thai-language online forums such as Pantip started speculating who 
                                                          
25 “Lakorn Koo Gum [Drama Fated Lovers],” Channel 5, accessed February 9, 2014 
<http://www2.tv5.co.th/web56/show_program_m.php?id=91>. 
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will be the pra-ek (พระเอก, hero) and nang-ek (นางเอก, heroine), referring to the male and female 
lead respectively. Names of up-and-coming actors were thrown out left and right. Debates over 
who was best suited for the roles of Angsumalin and Kobori erupted as fans were teeming with 
anticipation. Then in May of 2012, while at the press conference for their romantic pop musical 
collaboration Ruk Jup Jai (รกั จบั ใจ or Love Touch Heart), the two leads, Bie Sukrit Wisetkaew 
and Noona Nuengthida Sopon, confirmed that they will be reuniting for the lakorn remake of Koo 
Gum.26 Their announcement marked the beginning of a year-long whirlwind promotional tour.  
Within the next few months, preparations were made by the production company. Since 
this is a period lakorn, Exact was responsible for the design of wartime costumes and 1940s set 
pieces and scouting out filming locations. Bie and Noona donned their wardrobe for the first time 
at the fitting photoshoot for the promotional posters. On September 4, the pair and the entire 
supporting cast dressed in character at the oblation ceremony to inaugurate the start of filming. 
Entertainment reporters visited the set throughout the process to keep fans updated with periodic 
behind-the-scenes scoops on the progress of filming. About a week before the first broadcast, 
Channel 5 released short promos and published a booklet providing more details about the 
characters and storyline. One-hour episodes, interrupted by several advertisement breaks, began 
airing Mondays and Tuesdays at around 8:10pm. Soon after, Bie and Noona headed out to make 
brief appearances on several entertainment talk shows, celebrity news segments, and music 
programs. Official music videos from the original soundtrack with individual songs and a duet 
sung by the two main leads were uploaded online. In recent trends, a rating of 8 to 10 is considered 
                                                          
26 “‘Boy’ pat fun ‘Koo Gum’ wor ‘Bie-Kobori’ ‘Noona-Angsamulin’ long tua sut [Boy remakes ‘Koo Gum’ and brags 
that ‘Bie-Kobori’ and ‘Noona-Angsumalin’ are the perfect fits].” ‘ASTV Manager, May 10, 2012, accessed February 
9, 2013 <http://www.manager.co.th/entertainment/viewnews.aspx?NewsID=9550000057545>. 
Most actors sign a contract to work exclusively under one channel or production company for the allotted time. Bie 
was the runner-up in season three of The Star, an annual national singing competition, in 2006. He has since acted 
mostly for Channel 5 which, as a sponsor of The Star, has privileges to recruit actors from the contestant pools of the 
show. Noona, on the other hand, has worked for multiple channels in the past. 
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a success. Koo Gum scored an average of 3.5 over the course of its run, a moderate success for 
Channel 5 which does not draw viewer ratings as high as its competitors, Channel 3 and 7. A few 
months after the lakorn finished airing, Exact released a DVD box set. In the future, Channel 5 
could potentially sign a deal to sell the broadcast rights to China since Bie’s very first lakorn, Roy 
Adeed Hang Ruk (รอยอดีตแหง่รกั, 2006) was CCTV8’s second most-viewed drama of 2010.27 It is 
apparent that the commercialization of the lakorn motivates the channels to market every 
production from conception to the end of broadcast and sometimes even after that. 
Oh, the Drama! 
 The genre of the soap opera is the most salient and resilient narrative form in television. It has 
taken on many different forms across the globe since its American inception. Early U.S. daytime 
soaps were long-running serials without expectations of closure or an ending. The sense of time in 
the narrative, rather than being subordinated to plot considerations, takes on the characteristics of 
real time, creating the impression that events in the soap world continue unabated between 
episodes. Moreover, its narrative structure relies on the intertwining of multiple plot stands within 
any given episode. As an open serial, the American daytime soap only ends when the soap itself 
is cancelled.28 In the 1980s, when the serial form was in great demand, telenovelas put Latin 
America on the map. Literally meaning “a novel transmitted by television”, the telenovela 
symbolizes the conquest of Brazilian television for it has evolved into an international 
phenomenon.29 Most telenovelas, mainly from Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela, were 
financed directly by TV networks or independent producers and widely exported for audiences 
abroad in the late 1970s to 1980s. The telenovela is a melodramatic narrative mode inspired by 
                                                          
27 Parinyaporn Pajee, “Thai soap operas become popular in China,” McClatchy – Tribune Business News, Feb 19 
2011. 
28 Barker, 77. 
29 Monica Rector and Aluizio Ramos Trinta, “The ‘Telenovela’” Diogenes 29 (Mar 1981): 194. 
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prior forms in theatre and serial literature. While resembling the American soap, the telenovela is, 
nevertheless, a distinctive Latin American popular art form.30 They must have clear-cut stories 
with definite endings that permit narrative closure:  
Every TN starts with an apparently organized situation, which, in a second moment, reveals 
the existence of critical and troublesome relations, to reach a solution for the conflicts at the 
end, or, at least, indicate it. Three stages can here be distinguished: organization—
disorganization—reorganization. The third moment represents harmony between the 
elements, the absence of any problematic situation and the presence of positive values. This 
course is established according to the essential values of each society, according to its ethical-
moral code.31 
 
As a closed serial, the telenovela can take up to 200 episodes to complete its broadcast.32 Both the 
American soap and the telenovela have been influential to the composition and commercialization 
of television worldwide.  
Cinematic images are iconic in that they narrate stories, reflect collective or individual 
experiences and visualize certain dreamworlds and fantasies. Images of film also give a negative 
imprint or appearance of reality even while they fulfill the function of conveying information and 
signifying ideas.33 Annette Hamilton however argues that Thai society is not reproduced through 
the images that flow from cinema and television wherein representations of the real become stand-
ins for actual experience. Thailand’s dramaturgical principles are instead rooted in “varying 
structures of recognizable narrative and performance, some of which are based on much older 
forms.”34 In other words, Hamilton contends that Thai cinema and television are not always 
                                                          
30 Ana M. Lopez, “Our welcomed guests: Telenovelas in Latin America,” in To Be Continued…: Soap Operas around 
the world, ed. Robert C. Allen (New York: Routledge, 1995), 258.  
31 Rector and Ramos Trinta, 200. 
32 Robert C. Allen, “Introduction,” in To Be Continued…: Soap Operas around the world, ed. Robert C. Allen (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 18-23. 
33 May Adadol, “Introduction,” in Glimpses of Freedom: Independent Cinema in Southeast Asia, ed. May Adadol 
Ingawanij and Benjamin McKay (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2012), 8. 
34 Annette Hamilton, “Cinema and Nation: Dilemmas of Representation in Thailand,” in Colonialism and Nationalism 
in Asian Cinema, ed. Wimal Dissanayake (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 143.  
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explicit depictions of the real and lived. Rather, such images are heavily saturated with symbolic 
meaning to be interpreted and deciphered through traditional stories and concepts.35  
The lakorn, however, occupies a liminal space between representation and reality. This 
straddling of fiction and reality is derived from its subscription to the genre of the soap opera as a 
televised narrative loosely based on but exaggerated from real life. Television soaps are populated 
with “real” people in familiar landscapes. Viewers bring with them some idea of reality and test 
the on-screen fiction for “plausibility” in the world in which they live. Soap operas problematize 
the idea of fiction and fact and fantasy and reality as dualities or separate and opposed entities.36 
The world of the lakorn may be one of fictional melodrama. Yet its spectators attend to it as if it 
speaks of and to the real world. In contrast to Hamilton’s view, the lakorn, while relying on familiar 
tropes and traditional symbolism and despite its many plot embellishments, is still seen by viewers 
as a stand-in for the world around them. 
 Soap operas are premised on the balancing and blending of realism and melodrama. Realism 
refers to a set of conventions by which the drama stands as a representation of the real world with 
motivated characters, recognizable locations, and plausible social problems. Narrative techniques 
are used to deliberately obscure their own construct and present the story as real. Melodrama, in 
contrast, is grounded in the heightened sense of the dramatic with characters who lack sufficient 
motivation to fight through life’s torments. Characters act as icons for a particular emotional stance 
or dilemma sustained by the narrative and scenes. Elevated acting style, dramatic music, lingering 
close-up shots, and plot twists all work to stretch the credibility of the realist narrative.37 The 
                                                          
35 Hamilton, 144-145. 
36 Louise Spence, “’They killed off Marlena, but she’s on another show now’: Fantasy, reality, and pleasure in 
watching daytime soap operas,” in To Be Continued…: Soap Operas around the world, ed. Robert C. Allen (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 183.  
37 Barker, 78-79. 
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world’s first primetime soap, Coronation Street was introduced to British television in December 
of 1960. Its successful fusion of the generic community construct, humor and the working-class 
milieu pioneered the social realist strain within British drama.38 Coined as light entertainment, 
American primetime supersoaps, on the other hand, thrived more on “aesthetics of escape” that 
indulged in the lavish and extravagant at the expense of characterization. Dynasty and Dallas, for 
example, utilized consumption-oriented techniques such as high production value, glamorous 
wardrobes, affluent sets, good-looking and pampered characters, and overtly melodramatic plots. 
Such soaps are defined by their sentimental, artificially plotted drama reinforced by strong 
emotionalism, moral polarization, and inflated expressions.39 As either an outlet of escape or 
frivolous entertainment, soaps explores popular themes by blurring the line between fiction and 
reality. It is, to varying extents, an expanded imaginary of the real. 
Thai soaps have a stylistic flair to them as well – an exceedingly melodramatic one. 
Melodrama does not wish to represent the way events would unfold in the real world, but rather 
condenses, enhances, or expands moments of struggle, adventure, fear and disruption in order to 
over-represent them.40 Like an American supersoap, the Thai lakorn over the years has reveled 
more and more in the spectacle of opulence and exaggeration. The difference is rooted in how the 
lakorn melds facets and features of the Thai cultural repertoire into its storyline and characters. 
The nang chiwit (หนงัชีวติ, film of life), a popular dramatic Thai film genre, combines elements of 
the soap opera and Hollywood dramas in the 1940s. The significance of this genre is its 
interpretations were situated within frameworks of modern Thai life to endow narratives and 
characters with cultural specificity which strongly resonated with Thai audiences. Early nang 
                                                          
38 Dunleavy, 108-109. 
39 Dunleavy, 118-119. 
40 Annette Hamilton, “Family dramas: Film and modernity in Thailand,” Screen 33.3 (1992): 260. 
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chiwit usually followed a female protagonist embedded in a convoluted familial and romantic 
scenario from which she extricates herself in due course and gets her happily ever after but only 
through an arduous personal sacrifice.41 The lakorn is a serial nang chiwat on the small screen. On 
parallel with old melodramatic Thai films, several themes are given prerequisites for the plot: 
marital problems, female suffering, social marginality, and familial obligations. These problems 
both materialize and must be remedied through Thai notions of merit, karmic consequences, and 
family responsibility. The plot emerges from the family situation of the major characters wherein 
everyone must deal with the emotions and confusions behind a major crisis or series of crises:  
[The protagonists is] wrongly displaced from their proper social and financial heritage. This 
central character is forced into actions through no original fault of their own, but as a result of 
parental or familial misdeeds, of bad karma or events in past lives which are only now working 
themselves out…However, no matter how difficult or painful the circumstances may be, it is 
expected that there will be some kind of forgiveness and resolution among the characters at 
the end, even if great sacrifices are called for. The person who has been wrongly excluded from 
their family’s heritage will be reincorporated usually through marriage.42 
 
This basic configuration for the Thai lakorn has earned the undying loyalty of writers, directors, 
and viewers for decades. As a closed serial like the telenovela, the lakorn is completes its narrative 
arc within 12 to 25 episodes and airs for three to five months.43 The lakorn arrives at the third 
moment of reorganization where all conflicts are fully resolved in accordance to a religious-
cultural-moral canon. Along the way, though, it delves into the world of fantastic excess whose 
absurdity is exactly what constitutes its brilliance and charm.  
Susan Sontag defines camp as a sensibility structured on the “love for the unnatural: of 
artifice and exaggeration.” Camp is a mode of aestheticism that sees the world not in terms of 
                                                          
41 Hamilton (1992), 259. 
42 Hamilton (1992), 267.  
43 Each channel airs three primetime soaps within a week on Monday-Tuesday, Wednesday-Thursday, and Friday-
Sunday. Channel 5 and 7 air hour-long episodes. A lakorn usually ends within 20 episodes unless it is a special or 
large-scale production. Channel 3 airs two-hour-long episodes so their lakorn are shorter in terms of the number of 
episodes (usually 12-14) but comparable in terms of duration of total airtime. 
 
 
24 
 
beauty but rather in terms of degree of artifice and stylization. The trademark of Camp is its 
affection for extravagance. It is the theatricalization of experience that proposes itself seriously 
but should not be taken that way. Camp is the art of too much. “The ultimate Camp statement: it’s 
good because it's awful.”44 Lakorn followers live for the emotional thrill ride powered by 
preposterous plotlines. They smile, chuckle, cringe, shout, grasp, and cry along with the characters 
almost instantaneously. The ridiculousness of it all is which gives the lakorn such mass appeal.  
There is a specific Thai term to describe a campish tendency: nam nao (น ้าเน่า, literally 
rotten water). Originally a political term, the notion of nam nao has permeated into mass media 
and popular culture. Nam nao is a marker of predictability and exaggeration or wer (เวอ่ร์, over-
the-top/overdone) in plot devices, dialogue and acting techniques. The predictability of a lakorn 
nam nao is built on recurring themes and repetition of stories familiar to Thai audiences. Its 
exaggerated characteristic is established through larger-than-life characters, implausible scenarios, 
and a heightened sense of emotion or suspense. Yet the notion of nam nao adds another dimension 
to the critique of lakorn. Nam nao refers to narratives that reaffirm the traditional schematization 
of the Thai moral worldview and values system.45 Thus, the term not only bemoans the 
perpetuation of histrionic thematics and acting but also the stagnant condition of certain forms of 
Thai creative artistry and dramatic performances. Whereas camp is an aesthetic of too much, nam 
nao is an aesthetic of the same. It embraces the repetition of melodramatic clichés. It is the art of 
reprise that ironically does too little. 
Harsh criticism has targeted the rigidity of the imagined world of the Thai soap opera. 
Critics within and outside of the industry have lamented the one-dimensional quality of most Thai 
soaps. The majority of lakorn display the lifestyles of high-class society in all its splendor and 
                                                          
44 Susan Sontag, “Notes on Camp,” 1964. 
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affluence. Scenes in the capitol depict the dense city traffic, the airport, high-rise office buildings, 
shopping malls, international hotels, and private units in large modern hospitals. When the male 
protagonist leaves his luxurious mansion in the city, he vacations in famous holiday locations such 
as Pattaya, Chiangmai, or Phuket. Family, friendship, and martial drama are embroiled in scandals 
of prostitution, rape, madness, suicide, abortion, infidelity involving mistresses (or minor wife, 
เมยีน้อย), inheritance, scheming and even murder.46 Remakes after remakes preserve this formula 
in order to draw in high viewership and advertisement sponsors. The lakorn resides in a realm 
where values such as good and evil are clearly and conveniently positioned as polar opposites to 
allow audiences to predict the storyline until the end. Lost in the process is meaningful content 
with profound messages and an open-endedness that allows viewers to make their own 
assessments.47 The lakorn world is an idealized construct in which social hierarchy is a given. In 
the eyes of its critics, it is an elaborate façade built to valorize upper class society, wealth, and 
materialism. It misleadingly presents Thailand as a place where issues of economic inequality, 
gender discrimination, ethnic conflict, and rising urbanization are secondary to the pursuit of 
romantic love, individual achievement and familial unity. 
The Thai soap has the stigma for being the pinnacle of outlandish narrative construction 
and formulaic blandness. There seems to be this permanent cast of unnecessary characters: the 
noisy servant, the ladyboy best friend, the horrible mother-in-law, the inept villain, and more. Yet 
viewers often make deep connections between the storyline and their own lives for they see the 
lakorn as reflective of the real world. Soap watching has matured into a national pastime wherein 
gossip about each episode and the actors themselves are part of everyday conversations in a variety 
                                                          
46 Hamilton (1992), 265-266. 
47 “NBTC jat thot ‘Lakorn thai nay fan’ kruy thang ‘wichachip’ kam kap kan aeng [The NBTC organized a discussion 
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of settings. The lakorn is seen as this “cultural staple” for its steadfast place in contemporary Thai 
popular culture.48 Despite the criticism, the lakorn has risen to the top as an entertainment source, 
socialization tool, advertisement magnet, tabloid architect and export commodity.  
World of Fandom 
Sustained and loyal viewership from devoted fans has made television soaps the most 
successful broadcast programming in many countries. Serials have dominated daytime television 
schedules in the U.S. since the 1950s. Over half of American women between the ages of 18 and 
35 with TV sets at home follow at least one soap opera, incurring enormous profitability for US 
network broadcasters. A Chinese soap, Yearnings, in 1991 at the time became the biggest hit on 
television in Chinese history. From 1987 to 1988, the seventy-two part weekly serial of Ramayan, 
a Hindu religious epic, regularly drew in an audience of 80 to 100 million people in India.49 By 
1995, telenovelas from TV Global in Brazil had captured high ratings in all programming blocks, 
most notably 74% share during primetime hours and were being exported to 130 countries.50 “Soap 
mania” has infiltrated all corners of the globe.  
Such zealous spectatorship has created a thrilling world of fandom beyond the television 
screen. The term “fan”, short for “fanatic”, was first used in the sense of an audience member in 
the late 19th century to refer to a keen and habitual spectator of a professional sport. This term by 
the 1920s would encompass other elements of commodified mass culture (i.e. film). While 
Dorothy Hobson’s Crossroads: the Drama of a Soap Opera (1982) and Ien Ang’s Watching Dallas 
(1985) dealt with the reception of television soaps, their studies discussed “active audiences” or 
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50 Marilyn J. Matelski, Soap Operas Worldwide: Cultural and Serial Realities (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 
Inc., 1999), 10-12, 79-80. 
 
 
27 
 
“enthusiastic viewers” rather than television fans.51 It was not until Henry Jenkins’ canonical 
Textual Poachers (1992) that the most critical dimension was introduced to the term “fan.” The 
fans described by Jenkins were actively engaged with the “text” of television in many ways to 
produce material culture of their own and exhibit agency in their everyday media consumption.52 
Therefore, lakorn fandom refers both to an enthusiastic community of regular soap viewers and 
their creative engagements with the medium. 
After broadcast, Thai soaps take on a life of their own or more accurately, its spectators 
give them new lives. Shans living in Burma dub Thai soaps into their own language for local 
consumption. In Shan “production houses” or family rooms, those with sufficient knowledge of 
the Thai language record Thai soaps from satellite signals every night starting from 8:30pm. The 
dubbing team then gives the lakorn a complete makeover: changing the Thai names into Shan, 
inserting Shan pop songs as opening and closing credits, and dubbing the voices in Shan. The final 
videotape or VCD is sent to every town in Shan state where resident rental shops make multiple 
copies for distribution.53 With the help of technology, international fans today can follow a lakorn 
live from their computers or visit a handful of steaming sites whenever they can spare an hour or 
two. Multinational teams are formed on popular subbing sites to translate, subtitle, edit, and upload 
lakorn for fans worldwide to watch in a dozen other languages, mainly English and Chinese.54 
Transnational spectatorship is only one layer of the vast world of soap fandom. 
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Domestic lakorn fandom is thriving as well. At least a quarter of the population turn on 
their TV sets at 8:30pm every night to catch the lakorn.55 Dedicated fans do not stop at following 
each episode with their favorite actors. They frequent forums to have lengthy discussions about 
everything from the fashion worn by actors, the furniture in the sets to their forecast about future 
episodes. Established in 1997, Pantip has become the most visited Thai-language portal website 
for Thai fans to share news, participate in discussions, and connect with one another. Created in 
late 2010, Asianfuse (http://asianfuse.net/discuzz/forum/5-thai/) is the largest English-language 
forum for international fans to discuss lakorn and Thai entertainment in general. Many viewers 
form fanclubs of varying sizes to maintain active sites and social media pages relying information 
for the fan community to follow the star’s every move. Some create celebrity gossip blogs to post 
updates and commentaries about entertainment news. Others screencap each episode to give a 
scene-by-scene translation and summary for fans who do not understand Thai.56 Lakorn fandom 
is very much a collaborative spectatorship, aiming to build an active virtual community whose 
members share an enthusiasm for the Thai soap. 
But fandom is not always seen in a positive light. In their study of American soap fandom, 
C. Lee Harrington and Denise Bielby points out that media fans have a reputation for lacking the 
ability or willingness to tell the difference between fiction and reality. The stigma around the 
lunatic fan in the U.S. during the 1970s coincided with a growing market for news and gossip 
about entertainment celebrities. Since then, the media has reduced the perceived social distance 
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between ordinary people and the famous by creating and maintaining an illusion of intimacy.57 
Similarly, the high public profile of Thai soap actors and an impression of intimacy felt by their 
fans are affects abetted by the tabloids and entertainment media. Thai entertainment news is 
dominated by gossip about soap celebrities or literally stars (ดารา). It is not uncommon for 
hundreds of fans to show up to promotional events, press conferences, and talk shows to support 
their beloved stars. While fans’ obsession with the minute details of the private lives of their 
favorite soap stars can be perceived as unhealthy and irrational, it could also be framed as a creative 
process of identity and public knowledge formation. The atmosphere of fan idolization creates a 
sense in which the interpenetration of lakorn-world and real-world open up this collective fantasy 
space in which the private lives of soap stars became a new kind of public consciousness and 
knowledge.58 Whether lakorn fandom is delusional fanaticism or harmless enthusiasm, the Thai 
lakorn has nevertheless spawned an ardent culture of spectatorship which embraces and 
perpetuates the bleeding over of fiction into reality and of on-screen into off-screen.  
Conclusion: Lakorn Fever 
One of Thailand’s most well-known story is Sawan Biang (สวรรค์เบีย่ง, Heaven Diversion). 
Based on a 1970 novel by Krisna Asokesin, it has been made into a lakorn five times (1971, 1976, 
1988, 1998, and 2008). The synopsis of the 2008 remake demonstrates many key characteristics 
of the Thai soap: 
Leela is not wholeheartedly in love with her fiancé. During her university years, Leela was 
obsessed with Kawee (our male protagonist) only to have him react to her confession with utter 
arrogance. After having unrequited love for Kawee who accused her of chasing after rich men, 
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Leela is determined to marry a man that loves her. Luck with have it though that only five days 
before her wedding, Leela and her fiancé get into a car accident which takes his life but spares 
hers. Kit, having caused the accident that also took the life of his second wife, pays for Leela’s 
hospital bills and takes care of her until his pity turns into love. He asks for her hand in marriage. 
Even though she does not love him back, Leela accepts after overhearing slandering words from 
Kawee who happens to be Kit’s only son. Upon learning their relation, Leela is set on revenge. 
Kit allows Leela to invite her family to stay at his mansion together. She brings her younger 
sister, Narin (our female protagonist), her younger brother and mother to stay. Kawee is furious 
since he disapproves of the marriage from the beginning. Kawee soon finds out that his new 
stepmother is in fact Leela. He repeatedly argues with his father over this. One day, Kit goes into 
cardiac arrest and dies because of the stress stemming from the conflict with his son. Kawee feels 
regretful for being the reason for the death of his father. After the funeral, Kit’s will is read and 
his fortune is divided evenly between Leela and Kawee. But Kit secretly includes a provision which 
states that while they can live in separate quarters, the house can never be sold off. Leela agrees 
to this clause due to her love-hate feelings for Kawee. She hopes that Kawee would be forever 
reminded of his part in Kit’s death. Kawee continues to hate Leela for stealing his father’s love 
and lavishly spending the inheritance that rightfully belonged to his mother. 
Again and again, Kawee takes out his anger at Leela on Narin instead since they live in 
the same house. But he could not comprehend why his hatred made him want to see Narin’s face 
and argue with her. The more Kawee scrutinizes her, the more of her beauty he sees. Kawee falls 
in love with Narin without knowing. He grows possessive when her friend Tom starts pursuing her 
romantically. Kawee and Narin fight on many occasions. Even though Narin is mad at him, Kawee 
does not give in because he is someone who likes to win. When Leela and her family are away 
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from home, Narin returns home at a late hour. Enraged with jealousy because Narin is growing 
closer to Tom, Kawee rapes her that night. Narin is unable to continue facing her sister and moves 
out of the mansion only to discover that she is pregnant with Kawee. Kawee goes in search of her 
and realizes that she was carrying his baby. After contemplating his past misdeeds, Kawee follows 
Narin closely and caters to her every wish as he tries to become a better person. In the end, Narin 
accepts his sincerity and love after seeing Kawee atone for his mistakes. Narin returns to live in 
the mansion while Leela leaves to reflect upon her vengeful behavior in the past. Finally, everyone 
is back where they should be and living happily together in their home.59 
 
Illustration 1.3: DVD cover of Sawan Biang, starring Anne Thongprasom as Narin and Ken 
Theeradeth Wonpuapan as Kawee 
 Thai audiences have encountered these plot devices numerous time: family disputes over 
inheritance, revenge due to unrequited love, sibling jealousy, and the struggle for redemption. But 
“the conventions of soap opera storytelling are so strong that we can hardly say that we are 
watching to see what will happen. Rather, we watch anticipating what we know will happen once 
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again and to see how it will happen this time.”60 The nation was captivated by this most recent 
remake of Sawan Biang airing from March to May 2008. The ratings averaged 14.6, peaking at 
21.7 (13.88 million viewers). Did I tune in? You bet I did.  
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Chapter 2 
Repairing the Glitches:   
Grounds of Censorship in Times of Chaos and Change 
 
As the previous chapter highlights, the television industry in Thailand has experienced 
remarkable growth in terms of its influence, reach, and profits since the 1950s. Today, free-to-air 
television remains a major source of national and world news, entertainment, education, and 
filtered information about the royal family. Daily programming ranges from Thai-dubbed foreign 
films, talk shows, children cartoons, cooking programs, games shows to nationwide singing and 
talent competitions. The lakorn still retains its title as the programming with the highest 
commercial value, warranting its airing at the most coveted timeslot after the evening news. Like 
other soap operas around the world, the lakorn is perhaps a formulaic and overly dramatic rendition 
of run-of-the-mill stories. Yet in terms of viewership and advertisement revenues, it has managed 
to capture more of the nation than any other medium. Consequently, the lakorn receives added 
attention from both its spectators and policing bodies. 
What exactly is censorship? A “censor” originally refers to a Roman official tasked with 
counting the population and regulating its morals. The root of this term connotes the tallying of 
citizens and the notion of monitoring their expressions. Censorship in the contemporary sense is 
narrowly defined as state suppression of information and expression through state surrogates in 
panels, bodies and governmental agencies. The rhetoric of censorship invoked in the West often 
condemns such state repression as a violation of the universal right to free expression and a 
curtailment of civil liberties.61 Debates on censorship seemed to inevitably implicate the state. The 
First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, for example, nearly always refers to censorship as 
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government action to limit expression. Censorship in the American legal system refers almost 
exclusively to the government’s restriction, limitation, or filtering of information or ideas in 
speech, mass media such as newspapers and television, electronic media and the Internet usually 
prior to publication or broadcasting. Historically, under repressive forms of state, draconian 
censorship is often preceded by a desire to control the public. The Federal Communications 
Commission serves as the licensing body for broadcasting to ensure “the public interest, 
convenience or necessity.62 Censorship in the U.S. is a state channel of control over the access to 
ideas, opinions, and viewpoints. Its justification speaks to the need to protect public interest.  
While censorship certainly went hand-in-hand with the development of the Thai television 
industry, it was never a single act by a sole party within a historical and social vacuum. With its 
widespread reach, the lakorn contributed further to this growing sense of unease among the 
country’s policymakers about the ability of television to indoctrinate certain messages in its 
audiences. The analysis of lakorn censorship therefore is situated within the framework of general 
television censorship. This chapter lays the groundwork for understanding the evolving character 
of television censorship by speaking to and against the prohibition/institution model. It traces the 
legal threads of censorship since the state has frequently deployed the institution of law to 
corroborate its policing efforts. But the story of television censorship in the country for the last 65 
years is not simply a story of repressive state power. It is a history of contestation between the 
state and various actors over issues such as national security, Thai identity and legislative reform.  
Coding the Censors 
 There are four overlapping terrains of television law: laws protecting intellectual property 
such as patents and copyrights, the regulation of broadcast frequencies and technological standards 
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by national bodies, direct and indirect regulation of television content by the government, and 
“private censorship” or self-regulation (in-house agreements that influence television content).63 
This chapter speaks in varying extents to the latter three terrains. The focus on law is not to say 
that television is constrained by and constituted in a set of legal relationships. It is to say that 
television is made in concert with the elaborate social relations within government regulation of 
the consumer economy. Television – its production, regulation, consumption and censorship – are 
embedded in relations that involve law and a polity making and enforcing law.64 Outlining 
television law is to trace changing relations between state censors and the public. 
The 1955 Radio and Television Broadcasting Act built the legal foundation for the 
regulation of television. It required the licensing of all broadcasting by government officials in 
order for broadcasters to have access to adequate technical and financial resources. In truth, it was 
more to ensure that programming would reflect the nation’s core values.65 Since the codification 
of this law, the television industry has gone through significant developments, necessitating 
considerable changes in broadcasting legislation. The civilian government in 1974 created the 
National Broadcasting Executive Board (NBEB) under the National Broadcasting Authority to 
license and monitor transmission and programming. In 1977, the Mass Communications 
Organization of Thailand (MCOT) was authorized to administer broadcasting regulations. MCOT 
was primarily put in charge of television policy development while the Public Relations 
Department (PRD) oversee on program content, mainly in radio.66 It is apparent that several state 
agencies and enterprises simultaneously implemented the law. State supervision of broadcasting 
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was defined by overlapping responsibilities and multiple levels of authority. Industry leaders had 
to be cognizant of the range of regulations and protocols in place.  
The official legal code specifically for censorship was introduced in the Proclamations of 
the 1957 Revolutionary Group (item 6 of Proclamation 17) which bans all forms of publication 
with “false matter of a nature tending to panic, worry or frighten the people or matter tending to 
incite, or arouse disorder, or conflict with public order or morality, or prophecies concerning the 
fate of the nation which might upset people…” The methods of executing this policy, however, 
often fell out of the grounds of law. Formal rules provide just an excuse for dubious enforcement 
tactics such as unannounced police visits, warnings from unknown officials, or anonymous letters 
and phone calls.67  Television censorship gained a new level of legality and coordination under the 
direction of the Broadcasting Directing Board in 1975, headed by the Deputy Prime Minister and 
others recruited from the ranks of police and military.68 In 1976, the government passed Decrees 
No. 15 and 17 which imposed strict conditions on program content to all radio and TV stations. 
As a result, between 1977 and 1994, all television news programs were screened at 8pm on a daily 
basis.69 Television censorship was the responsibility of a panel of four people selected by the 
Broadcast Directing Board. The censors had jurisdiction over all programs, making daily rounds 
to all the stations to check the programs before airtime. They were meticulous in this line of work, 
watching every scene and listening to every line. The explicit goal was to guarantee that televised 
images, sounds, and language could not threaten national peace and unity.70 Evidently, the 
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government has played a mediating hand in television broadcasting. Interactions between the state 
and mass media has long been characterized by threats, pressure, and coercion.  
The 1980s not only ushered in boom period for the television industry, but for print media 
as well. Under the elected government of Chatichai Choonhavan, the media gradually began to 
assert an independent, critical spirit. This time period saw rising political demands from an affluent 
new class being articulated on television and in press, allowing for increased freedom of mass 
media.71 The Chatichai government had brought an end to the military’s post-1976 strategy of 
guided democracy in an effort to shift the foundations of power away from bureaucracy and the 
military to the Cabinet and business. However, the exposure of government corruption and 
suspicious ties to the business sector by the press during this time considerably weakened support 
from the urban middle class. On February 23, 1991, a group of generals staged a coup by holding 
Prime Minister Chatichai at gunpoint.72 What followed would go down in Thai history as the 
epitome of the state of chaos that arises from stringent state suppression of opposition voices. More 
media freedom had only worked to further amplify the state’s preoccupation over bad press and in 
turn, its efforts at concealment. This time, it was the military that acted as big brother. 
Media Warfare 
Black May, as it came to be called, was a brutal affair that brought major problems 
underlying Thai political censorship to light. Justifying their actions as an anti-corruption crusade, 
the Class Five generals of the coup group later formed the National Peacekeeping Council (NPKC) 
to forcefully dismiss parliament. When news emerged on the military’s intentions of drafting a 
new constitution, pro-democracy groups joined forces under the Campaign for Popular Democracy 
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(CPD) in protest of the junta’s growing despotism.73 The Suchinda government started intensifying 
television censorship in early May while permitting only material that was supportive or uncritical 
of the administration to air. On May 7, the government cut off all satellite feeds used by foreign 
television organizations to curtail the damaging news traffic from abroad.74 State endeavors to run 
interference simply escalated the gravity of the situation as more grew intolerant of the 
irresponsibility and irresponsiveness of the government. 
On May 17, 1992, over 200,000 protesters participated in a mass demonstration at Sanam 
Luang in Bangkok to oppose the Suchinda government. Over the next 3 days, the NPKC junta 
enacted a violent plan that was designed for a communist insurrection wherein fully armed soldiers 
shot into the crowd and beat up demonstrators. The military backlash to the protest movement was 
branded as a valid force of resistance against what Suchinda claimed was a premeditated attack on 
the system of government and constitutional monarchy.75 Mainstream broadcast media did not 
dare to show the protests around the Democracy Monument, Thammasat University and 
parliamentary headquarters leading up to Black May, but instead offered the usual lineup including 
extensive coverage of 1992 Miss Universe pageant taking place in Thailand.76 Television channels 
failed to report the death of at least 50 civilians under the hands of the troops on top of depicting 
protestors as disruptive troublemakers. Coverage of the military violence by CNN and BBC 
stepped up to filled in the void left by state-controlled television with the press pushing forward 
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with full reports in face of military warnings. The widespread uproar over the violence prompted 
the unprecedented intervention by King Bhumiphol to put an end to the conflict. Television 
viewers saw the now infamous scene in which Suchinda and pro-democracy leader Chamlong 
Srimuang crawled on the floor towards the King who reprimanded them and obligated them to 
embrace conciliation. The King later appointed Anand Panyarachun as interim prime minister in 
June 1992.77  
The events of May 1992 did not just destroy years of relative national peace and marked a 
transition in which clashes between the state and mass media became more overt and hostile. The 
1990s signaled a new era of censorship prompted by this irreconcilable antagonism between the 
two sides. Duncan McCargo believes that the May protestors did not merely oppose the 
premiership of Suchinda Kraprayoon; they were refusing to be subsumed under a political order 
in which the military and bureaucracy exerted immense influence. The vicious war between 
entrenched state power and collective popular will in a rapidly-changing urban society was raged 
on a media battlefield. Awarded to the victor was the supreme control of information.78 Thus, in 
the aftermath of all the pandemonium lies the challenge of reconfiguring the web of relations 
between the state, the media and the public. At the forefront of this task is the question of the role 
of mass media and its accountability to society. The peril facing media in Thailand was its 
vulnerability to shifting from watchdog to lapdog of the state. Television censorship during Black 
May was a pivotal for assessing and accelerating the need for media reform.  
Push for Reform 
After the bloody military crackdown, the censorship of television continued to be a state-
heavy project. The interim Anand government replaced the NBEB with the National Broadcasting 
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Commission (NBC) with a charter to censor program content and override both the MCOT and 
PRD. It was allowed to impose conditions about the establishment and removal of stations and to 
prescribe rules for program supervision and advertisements. The 1994 Regulation on Broadcasting 
No. 14 passed by the first Chuan government expanded the grounds of censorship to include 
offences against public order or moral standards. Station directors had to be of Thai nationality, 
programs must be in Thai with few exceptions, and hosts and announcers must hold a certificate 
issued by the PRD. Since the military, juridical powers, local officials, the National Culture 
Commission, and the Office of the Prime Minister were all involved in some capacity, 
broadcasting administrators were simultaneously circumventing and catering to the different 
interests of various departments.79 Television censorship, by this time, had turned into an intricate 
business driven by political, economic, and nationalistic interests.  
The atmosphere of enthusiasm surrounding the new liberal 1997 Constitution however was 
conductive for extensive media reform. Article 40 of the new Constitution called for the 
establishment of an independent National Broadcasting Commission to supervise all television and 
radio stations.80 There was much optimism behind Article 40 insofar as it would for once install 
an independent agency to be the industry regulator. While the PRD and the Army wanted just one 
regulator, the reformers (the Council of Mass Communication Faculty Members of Thailand, 
several NGOs and civil liberties groups, and the Monitoring Group on Article 40) wanted two 
separate committees to ensure sufficient attention was being paid to concerns of public interest. 
After some discussion, there were plans to set up both the National Broadcasting Commission 
(NBC) and the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), each headed by seven 
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commissioners. The NBC would draft a master plan for broadcasting related to education, religion, 
arts and culture, national security, and agriculture.81 Commissioners will be selected by the Senate 
from a list of nominees from academia, government agencies, professional associations and civic 
and nongovernmental groups to serve six-year appointments.82 But as the appointment process 
went underway, the campaign for media reform developed into more of a wrestling match than a 
collaborative agreement. The push for reform was being incessantly stalled as the government, the 
private operators and the reformers were hashing it out over the division of power within the two 
committees. Despite fervent disagreements, vote-blocking and aggressive lobbying from all sides, 
the functions of the NBC were never finalized.83 The broadcasting sector was still missing an 
independent regulatory body. In times of chaos, censorship was a means to silence dissent. Even 
in times of much-needed change, little was being done. 
By the turn of the 20th century, the Thai television industry was put at a standstill in terms 
of policy development. The need for the deregulation and democratization of state censorship laws 
was placed on the backburner for a while as Thailand transitioned to the leadership of then Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. However, the relative calm was just the eye of a brewing storm of 
chaos that was about to assault Thailand in the most alarming way. With the controversy behind 
the 2006 coup d'état of Thaksin’s second administration, his criminal trial, court-ordered eviction, 
and the now infamous Red vs. Yellow Shirts protests, the advancement of a free mass media amidst 
this backdrop of turmoil was up in the air. 
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Troubleshooting 
Thaksin Shinawatra, a business tycoon, won a landslide election in 2001 and reelection in 
2005. His populist-leaning policies threatened the political equilibrium set by the royal palace, the 
military, and to an extent, Privy Council under an aging Prem Tinsulanonda. He was toppled by a 
military coup supported by the palace and Privy Council in September 19, 2006. Thailand was 
thrown into complete disarray after the coup. Thaksin was not simply a controversial politician; 
he symbolized a challenge to the monarchy. Deeply invested in this kind of symbolism, the anti-
Thaksin Yellow Shirts under the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) resumed demonstrations 
in May 25, 2008 to object to the People Power Party (PPP) government under Samak Sundaravej. 
The PAD viewed this coalition that came into power in the 2007 elections as a form of Thaksin 
proxy rule.84 In December 2008, the Constitution Court dissolved the pro-Thaksin PPP. After some 
shuffling of party allegiance and alliance-making, the Democrat Party claimed the majority in a 
coalition government that voted in Abhisit Vejjajiva as Prime Minister.85 With unresolved 
tensions, the new premiership did not signal an end to this tumultuous period in Thai politics. 
The Radio and Broadcasting Business Act of 2008 was born out of this volatile post-coup 
climate. It returned Thailand to the strict culture of television censorship reminiscent of past times 
of great political instability. The Act specified in Section 37: 
Any broadcast content which seeks to overthrow constitutional monarchy, destroy national 
security and morality, or harm the mental and physical health of the population must be 
barred from airing.86  
 
Because the language of the new law was comparable to that of its predecessors, this legislation 
did not elicit much interest at the time. Then a February 2010 Supreme Court verdict seized $1.4 
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billion of Thaksin’s personal fortune after finding him guilty of abuse of power and malfeasance. 
Thaksin was sent on the run.87 With his exile, Thailand seemed on the brink of total catastrophe. 
The court ruling set off the last phase of a fatal confrontation between the Abhisit 
government and pro-Thaksin Red Shirts protesters under the United Front for Democracy against 
Dictatorship (UDD). Mounting resentments and gripe between the two erupted in April 2010 when 
the military’s handling of civilian protest exacerbated into a deadly militarized brawl. On April 7, 
when protestors stormed Parliament, the government declared state of emergency, effectively 
handing power over to the military to restore order by terminating the Red Shirts movement at 
whatever costs. On May 19, the last of many government operations forcefully ended the protests, 
claiming 50 civilian lives over the month-long offensive.88 The frenzy of the Bangkok protests and 
the frantic media storm around it culminated in this moment. International and domestic media 
coverage of the military crackdown had again captured Thailand “coming apart at the seams.”89 
While in the shadows of the recent bloodshed of April-May 2010, the passage of a new 
legislation attempted to take the first steps in putting the pieces back together. In December, the 
NRA Organization Act of 2010 finally managed to set up the National Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Commission (กสทช./NBTC) thereby replacing the NBC and NTC as a single 
convergent regulator for the broadcasting and telecoms sectors. The NBTC was to be headed by 
11 commissioners (1 Chairman and 5 from each respective sector) appointed in 2011. The NBTC 
was responsible for issuing a master plan as the five-year guideline for broadcasting business and 
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spectrum policy.90 The NBTC has recently published its second annual report for the year 2012 
and remains the chief body in charge of television censorship today. 
 
Regulatory body 
 
Legal 
status 
 
Administration and 
management 
 
Regulation and 
supervision 
National Broadcasting 
Commission  
(1992-1998); 
new NBC created in 
August 1998 but never 
finalized 
Political 
regulatory 
agency 
Issues, renews and 
cancels licenses for 
television operators; 
provide technical 
assistance 
Determines broadcasting 
guidelines for program 
content and advertising; 
censors and directs 
program content;  
removal of stations 
Mass Communication 
Organization of Thailand 
(MCOT) 
State 
enterprise 
Licensee for Channel 9 
and 3; provide television 
policy advice 
Implements NBC 
(NBTC) program 
regulations 
Public Relations 
Department (PRD) 
State 
agency 
Licensee for Channel 11 Issues speech certificates 
for all broadcasting hosts 
National Broadcasting 
and Telecommunications 
Commission (NBTC), 
2010 - present 
Convergent 
regulatory 
agency 
Issues, renews and 
cancels licenses for 
television and 
telecommunications 
operators 
Replaces NBC as main 
regulator for broadcast 
and telecom regulation  
Table 2.1: Powers and functions of regulatory bodies of the broadcast sector in Thailand91 
Serial Temporality 
Thai cinema has struggled under state censorship as well. The Film Act of 1930 was the 
main legislation for censorship that went largely unchanged for decades. The Cinema Act of 1971 
reserved the right to ban films deemed insulting to royalty, portrayed notorious criminals or 
discredited the government.92 Since lèse majesté law makes it a crime to “defame, insult, threaten 
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or in any way violate the revered position of the King” and the royal family, the censorship board 
requires that any depiction of the monarchy, even in the most reverent manner, to be approved 
prior to its exhibition or screening.93 The board also objects to depictions of Buddhist monks in 
any manner other than absolute reverence, prostitution, and sexual promiscuity.94  
When director Apichatpong Weerasethakul submitted his 2007 film Syndromes and a 
Century to the board before its domestic release, the board’s decision would spark a notorious 
battle between filmmakers and erratic state censorship. The Ministry of Culture forced him to cut 
four scenes: a young monk strumming the guitar, two monks playing with a toy UFO in a public 
park, a middle-aged female doctor drinking a bottle of liquor with some colleagues, and a doctor 
kissing his girlfriend.95 The director went on to galvanize the independent film community and 
launched the Free Thai Cinema Movement to change the existing Film Act. His 8-month-long 
protest resulted in in the promulgation of the Film and Video Act which went into effect in August 
of 2009 with a new classification system.96  
All films are now screened and given a rating by the censorship board prior its theatrical 
release in Thailand. The ratings are advisory to allow movie-goers to decide for themselves 
whether or not to abide by the board’s suggestion. The new law also authorizes the state to prohibit 
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the release of movies that “undermine or disrupt social order and moral decency, or that might 
impact national security or the pride of the nation.”97 The film censorship board also retained its 
right to ban a film entirely under the new system.98 When a provocative Thai adaptation of 
Macbeth (Shakespeare Must Die, 2012), a melodrama about a transvestite’s dysfunctional family 
(Insects in the Backyard, 2010), and documentary-style film exploring the persecution of Thai 
Muslims (This Area is Under Quarantined, 2009) were submitted, the film censorship board 
banned all three.99 Censorship authorities tend to formulate their justification for censoring a film 
in terms of its transgression of national identity and security. May Adadol Ingawanij believes that 
these articulations “rests on a conception of cinema’s power that acknowledges and emphasizes 
the mimetric potency and mobile visibility of film.” Film is able to stimulate imitative behavior 
among the young and the masses. Secondly, film is able to enter an international stage and 
therefore must adhere to certain parameters of sanctioned national representation.100  
While the censorship of lakorn is also justified along those lines, it is distinguished by the 
very same qualities that differentiated it from other forms of television programming and visual 
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mediums – its commercial, mainstream, and soap opera appeal. For decades, the soap opera was 
the most successful broadcast advertising vehicle in the United States.101 Since the 1980s, the 
lakorn too is the most lucrative form of television broadcast in Thailand. Its main purpose is to 
reap in profit as evident by the dozens of advertisements and corporate sponsors that partially fund 
lakorn productions to sell products and services. The lakorn is intended for a specific audience 
only in the sense that it targets as high of a viewership as possible. Thailand only produces about 
a dozen mainstream movies annually. Even fewer documentaries and independent films are 
released for general viewing. In contrast, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the three main 
channels produced a combined total of approximately 70 primetime lakorn in a year’s time for 
free-to-air television. Finally, lakorn spectatorship, often in the privacy of the home, is structured 
by the serial pace of the soap genre. The serial is a form of narrative organized around 
institutionally-imposed gaps in the text. The enforced and regular suspensions of narrative 
progression produce a different mode of spectator engagement compared to the film.102 The serial 
timing of lakorn is also significant to the temporality of its censorship.  
The sheer number of lakorn alone makes it difficult for the state censors to screen all 
content. Rather than a rating or at worst, a ban given by a certified board, lakorn censorship is a 
semi-intelligible process that involves its creators (self-censorship), internal and external censors. 
A form of self-regulation occurs in U.S. commercial television networks, for example, where 
program practices departments are employed to systematically and thoroughly censor scripts for 
mainstream audiences and advertisers.103 Due to its commercialization, the lakorn is also censored 
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first by its scriptwriters, directors and producers from the beginning to be void of taboo or polemic 
subject matters in order to cater to mainstream tastes. The second level of censorship falls under 
the jurisdiction of the channels. The censorship committee for each channel uses simple corrective 
measures to edit their lakorn prior to broadcast such as blurring out images of cigarettes, alcohol, 
weapons (mainly knives and guns), and partial nudity, cutting the sound when there is offensive 
or abrasive language, and adding a disclaimer for an illegal activity (i.e. gambling). The manner 
and extent in which to edit these types of scenes is up to the discretion of the network censor. 
Evidently, the grounds of censorship for lakorn are ambiguous and somewhat arbitrary.  
 
Illustration 2.1: Post-production censorship practices include blurring out images (left - Game Rai 
Game Ruk; เกมรา้ยเกมรกั - Ch.3, 2011) or running a disclaimer about illegal activities (right - Khun 
Chai Ronnapee; คณุชายรณพีร์ - Ch.3, 2013) 
 
A television content rating system has been in place since 2006 with slight changes made 
in September of 2013 by the NBTC. The first three levels - Level 1 (ป 3+) for children ages 3-5, 
Level 2 (ด 6+) for children from ages 6 to 12, Level 3 (ต) for general audiences – mostly concerns 
daytime programming. A Level 4 rating (น 13+) is given to programs with material unsuitable for 
viewers under 13 years old or calls for parental guidance for children under the age minimum. 
Broadcasters can only air such programs between 8:30pm and 5am. Level 5 (น 18+) covers 
programs that contain coarse language, sexual situations or moderate violence. Lastly, Level 6 (ฉ) 
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covers adult programming that contain crude or indecent language and explicit sexual activity or 
violence. While these ratings must appear at the start of all TV shows, the channel is given the 
right to rate its own programs.104 The intention behind this system is to roughly draw the 
boundaries of appropriateness. These criteria, however, do not stipulate the specifics and the extent 
of what is considered suitable material for each rating. Since the NBTC relies on the channels to 
self-censor, there is no external state system reviewing lakorn content in its entirety before airplay. 
 
 
Illustration 2.2: The content rating for Thong Neua Gao (ทองเน้ือเกา้ - CH.3, 2013) is verbally 
announced before the opening theme song and displayed intermittently throughout the episode at 
the bottom left-hand corner. 
 
Conclusion: Insurance Policy  
The Thai state has historically capitalized on electronic media as its ideological 
mechanism. It can be used as personal political tool as with the government under Field Marshal 
Phibun and/or an instrument to build political consensus as with Field Marshal Sarit and his 
successors in the 1960s. The media war of Black May demonstrated how television was exploited 
by the state to save face and save it from persecution. The Suchinda government openly asserted 
that it did not have a policy curbing freedom of the press while continually accusing the press for 
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instigating public unrest, threatening national security and creating confusion among members of 
the public.105 These instances shows how televised images have long been central to the Thai 
state’s management of cultural, political and social expression. State censorship was said to be in 
the name of preserving national unity, state legitimacy, and political stability. It becomes a vital 
state resource to dictate how to best represent itself and its version of what is means to be Thai. 
The notion of Thai identity has been propagated by governments throughout history to 
strengthen Thai nationalism. By the 1930s, the Thai state was vigorously trying to codify and 
promote a national culture. One Cultural Mandates after another promulgated Thai-ness: changing 
country’s name from Siam to Thailand, encourage the use of the word Thais for the whole 
population, and creating the flag, national and royal anthems as national symbols.106 The National 
Cultural Maintenance Act, a royal decree in 1940, defined culture to be “qualities which indicated 
and promoted social prosperity, orderliness, national unity and development and the morality of 
the people.” Then in 1977, the Office of the Prime Minister gave life to this concept with a monthly 
magazine, Thai Identity (เอกลกัษณ์ไทย), to articulate that strong national Thai culture was vital to 
the country’s independence and sovereignty.107 Thai identity and culture have been put on this 
pedestal for being fundamental in preserving the strength and integrity of the nation. The state was 
acutely involved in every step to crystallize the nexus of identity, culture and nationhood. The 
extent of government commitment and patronage to this project underscores the necessity of the 
notion of Thai cultural identity to state ideology. 
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What does this mean for television censorship? In June 2012, Kong Rithdee, an esteemed 
film critic for the Bangkok Post, penned a critical commentary about modern television in Thailand 
after the public outcry over a female contestant on a reality TV show, Thailand’s Got Talent, who 
bared her breasts in a performance of expressionist painting. Television, he says, is now the root 
of distress, infamy and national hysteria over the need to preserve Thai values. Puritans, especially 
in the Ministry of Culture, “beat the drum of censorship” with “hypocrisy and cheap moralism” to 
save the image of the country. Censorship authorities confine the debate to simply matters of 
indecency. That is, televised breasts are obscene but televised coups are not. He pushes for the 
cultivation of media literacy in which viewers develop “immunity against the manipulation of 
media corporates” and their “greedy masquerade and mercenary ploys.” State censorship stands in 
opposition to media literacy because it robs us of our right to close our own eyes.108 His words 
make apparent that this culture of state censorship of television has been in the making for years. 
State censors were unmistakably intended for policing Thai national identity under the pretense of 
cultural preservation and the maintenance of public well-being. Censorship was a vehicle to 
expunge the sounds and images of alterity and vulgarity. It is the privilege of blindfolding public 
eyes, quarantining damaging information, and monopolizing the terrains of knowledge.  
The role of the state in the censorship of the lakorn in particular offers even a more 
convoluted picture. Once on air, the lakorn has passed two levels of censorship: self-censorship 
and internal censorship. The NBTC was given authority to operate as the final and only external 
censor with and within a policy that gave it powers over vaguely defined areas. In recent years, 
there have been cases where channels have had to submit to forced edits of highly suggestive 
scenes while a lakorn was already in broadcast rotation (Chapter 3). In early 2013, the ban of a 
                                                          
108 Kong Rithdee, “If the TV went a breast too far, then turn it off,” Bangkok Post, June 12, 2012. 
 
 
52 
 
lakorn before its complete broadcast sparked a major dispute, reprising questions about free media 
and political machinations (Chapter 4). The involvement of the NBTC in all these cases only made 
the incoherence of state censorship policies even more salient. Lakorn censorship is an undertaking 
lined with contradictions, ironies, inadequacies, and conundrums. The operation of the Thai censor 
interface, it turns out, is every bit as enigmatic and unpredictable as its constituents.  
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Chapter 3 
Scandalizing Sexuality:  
The Scrutiny of Thai Gender Roles and Feminine Desires  
 
Songkram Nangfah (สงครามนางฟ้า - Ch.5, 2008) was a major TV scandal much to the 
dismay of Thai flight attendants, the Ministry of Culture, and its producers. The 2008 soap ignited 
a media firestorm that smeared the names of most involved. Only two weeks into its airtime, 
Songkram Nangfah made headlines not for its brazen exposé of a fictional Thai airline but for its 
sexualized rendering of the flight crews. In an official complaint to the Ministry of Culture, the 
trade union representing Thai aircrews demanded that the station immediately pull the “ugly soap 
opera” off the air. Union official Noppadol Thaungthong branded the lakorn as being “all about 
sex and air hostesses beating each other up in the cabin because of love and jealousy.” The outburst 
of protest urged its producers Exact to appease the union with a promise of longer skirts and no 
more catfights scenes between flight attendants while they are on duty or in uniform. The director 
apologized for all the trouble claiming that it was unintentional and the lakorn was made for the 
sole purpose of entertainment.109 This entire fiasco, from the statement made by the union official 
to the concessions made by the production company, shows the gendered nature of lakorn 
censorship. It was not necessarily the adultery and debauchery of the male characters that triggered 
this huge outcry of criticism. Rather, it was the appalling and disgraceful behavior of its female air 
stewardesses who have come to represent a certain trademark and standard of Thai femininity.  
The images and representations of Thai women have generated much inquiry into their 
possible reproduction of a discriminatory gender culture. Traditional perceptions of Thai women 
as valiant and courageous, yet fragrant and lovely; intelligent, yet willingly subservient and 
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submissive can be found in early depictions in literature. A passage in the Traiphumikkatha, a 
masterpiece of Thai Buddhist literature composed in the early Sukhothai period (1239-1377), 
paints the ideal Thai woman: “Regally mounted upon her own war elephant, the proud queen rides 
forward into battle besides her king.” Her existence is indispensable but secondary to that of a 
man. In past decades, Thai women have achieved high levels of success in the business, academia 
and government. Despite these significant social and professional gains, modern Thai women still 
must contend with the ideal role of the dutiful daughter, virtuous and faithful wife, and selfless 
and devoted mother.110 The ideal Thai woman is imagined in the domestic sphere as a guardian of 
the family and marriage. This idealized subjectification of the Thai woman into this beautiful 
creature whose wholesomeness and docility are overshadowed only by her familial piety and 
marital fidelity poses a problem for both real and fictional women who do not strictly fit this mold.  
The presence and (re)presentation of Thai women and effeminate transgendered men in the 
lakorn have been the root of several TV scandals. In this chapter, I examine several cases in which 
the problematic displays of (ef)femininity and feminine desires on television have been subjected 
to restriction by state and non-state actors. In my account of the process of censorship in each case, 
I will give a quick synopsis of the lakorn in question, explain the impetus for censorship, detail 
the rationale given by the group or organization involved and trace the course of resolution that 
occurs at the censor interface. This chapter illustrates how censorship is another domain of gender 
politics. I argue that Thai gender and sexual norms have governed the course of action at the 
interface. But the appearance of characters outside of Thai heteronormative paradigms in lakorn 
is not prohibited. The issue at hand is whether or not their sex/gender deviance undermine such 
paradigms. In these cases, queer characters and sexualized female characters are critically assessed 
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at the censor interface against a benchmark of conventionality. The call for censorship is made to 
“correct” their extreme transgression of conventions on sexual conduct and gender roles. The end 
result is an affirmation of existing norms wherein these characters are “recast” to fit a proper 
(enough) role in the Thai gender culture. My investigation reveals censorship to be an effective 
strategy of appropriation and normalization not to deny sex/gender diversity within the country 
per se but to understate the extent of its alterity.  
Queer Exploit 
At the heart of the issue over state prohibition of visual representations is what Peter 
Jackson has aptly coined “the Thai regime of images.” This regime of images is an apparatus of 
differentiated power exerted systematically to control actions and discourses within the public 
sphere. When actions or statements do not conform to an idealized form, they are perceived and 
constructed to be “disruptive.” These unwanted disruptions then necessitate an array of immediate 
actions to expel them from the public domain. This powerful mechanism of monitoring dictates 
what can and cannot be presented as public knowledge in Thailand.111 Consequently, this regime 
fuels an essentialism of surface appearances wherein the real is hidden and unchallenged while 
what is on the surface is easily grasped and taken as real.112 The Thai regime of images functions 
as a protective barrier against any visuals, behaviors, and expressions hazardous to the archetype 
of the Thai public image. According to Jackson, it is an aggressive guardian of a public face that 
must remain untarnished.  
Televised images have a high degree of availability since the majority of the population 
has access to electricity, a television set, and is literate. Jackson argues that the divide between 
public and private is perpetually upheld by this regime of positive images that filters out that which 
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can result in a loss of face. Consequently, the normative and morally proper are permitted to 
occupy privileged public spaces. On the contrary, the abnormal, immoral and unseemly are 
relegated to the private domain. A transgression of this entrenched divide is a failure to conform 
to expected norms. Such a mistake will assuredly incite the operation of state censorship laws and 
other legal and institutional means to put everything back into its designated place.113  
With respect to gender under the Thai regime of images, the public display of normative 
masculinity and femininity is permitted while transgenderism and homosexuality must be 
consigned to the private domain. With this juxtaposition of public decency and private choice, the 
Thai state on the surface does not seem to criminalize homosexuality or transgenderism or 
intervene into individual’s private sexual lives. Nonetheless, the public representation of 
gender/sex minorities in electronic media has developed into an issue of contention since the 
1980s.114 On one hand, a range of state institutions that includes the police, academics, state-based 
medical and health professionals, and the Office of National Culture Commission are all enveloped 
in monitoring the propriety of public images of the bodies of Thai men and women. Media owners, 
journalists, and civil society, on the other hand, have resisted the strict definition of proper public 
behavior propagated by state bureaucracy and authorities.115 As the media and society grew more 
critical of a binary gender configuration, the stronghold of this gender culture on Thai lives began 
to fragment. At the same time, in order to uphold its standards of morally appropriate public 
behavior, the state has refused to broaden its views on eroticism and indecency.  
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State censorship of representations of sex/gender minorities revolves around Thai notions 
of obscenity. In pre-1850 Thai culture, it was not the public display of sexual organs but the 
expression of sexual emotion that was perceived as obscene. The exposure of the naked body 
started to be a legally punishable act in the latter half of the 19th century as Western notions of 
public modesty and propriety was adopted. The modern Thai body, encompassing “the public 
enactment and fashioning of masculinity and femininity along Western lines,” is now become an 
object policed by Thai obscenity laws.116 If this regime heavily restricts and regulates the 
circulation of images of Thai bodies, what can the Thai viewer see on television?  
Since homosexuality and transgenderism in Thai society lie outside the bounds of 
convention, such sexual orientations have been previously painted as a form of defiance and an 
epidemic social problem. But Thai television has long been flooded with male-bodied effeminacy 
as katoey and gays have hosted talk shows and frequently been guests on entertainment programs. 
State anxieties about the high number of images of non-normative sexual behaviors in media was 
reflected in a government attempt to ban television programs featuring frivolous shows of 
transvestites and transsexuals under the directive of then Prime Minister Chuan Leepai in 1999.117 
The continued hypervisibility of the katoey prompted the Minister of Education under the Thaksin 
government in 2004 to request a reduction in queer characters in television because they were not 
good role models for children. Queer representations on television were seen as more glamorized 
and hence more likely to be emulated. Queerness was at once both fashionable and contagious.118 
The saturation of the image of the katoey has notably spilled over to the small screen. The katoey 
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also still reigns as the dominant visual representation of queerness in larger society, suggesting 
that the private/public divide under the regime of images is not as stringent as Jackson supposes.  
But representations of queerness in Thai mass media can only push against the boundaries. 
The katoey in mainstream queer cinema, for instance, illustrates the limits of the queer challenge 
to heteronormativity. The post-2000 wave of Thai queer cinema treated transgenderism and 
homosexuality more sensitively rather than reduced katoeys to the “stereotypical roles of 
screaming clowns.”119 Yet, this new agency granted to katoeys in these films was exercised more 
for becoming a good member of Thai society than for contesting underlying power structures. 
Katoeys were “cinematically integrated into the national narrative of group-centrism and sacrifice” 
in which they were presented as more compassionate, tolerant and capable of enduring suffering.120 
Cinematic representations did not provoke state censors as long as they address alternative sexual 
positioning within these predetermined confines of subjectivity. This pattern of standardizing the 
figure of queerness suggests that homosexuality can be neutralized, normalized, and even cured. 
Representations of queerness in lakorn follow suit. Katoey and effeminate gay men are 
usually casted in comic relief roles in Thai soaps. Similar to film, these characters are in minor 
roles of the best friend or sidekick whose flamboyant mannerisms and silly tantrums balance the 
sentimental, melodramatic sequences of the lakorn. Appearances of lesbians or dii are highly 
uncommon and negligible at best, usually in roles of servants and everyday workers.121  Unlike in 
                                                          
119 Serhat Ünaldi, “Back in the spotlight: the cinematic regime of representation of Kathoeys and gay men in Thailand.” 
in Queer Bangkok:21st Century Markets, Media and Rights, ed. by Peter Jackson (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2011), 64. 
120 Ünaldi, 68-70. 
121 Recent lakorn with queer female characters: Panyachon Kon Krua (ปญัญาชนกน้ครวั – Ch.3, 2012), Full House 
(วุน่นกั รกัเต็มบา้น – TrueVisions, 2014); Lakorn with heterosexual female characters dressing up as men: Sompong 
Nong Somchai (สมปองน้องสมชาย - Ch.3, 2004), Taddao Bussaya (ทดัดาวบษุยา - Ch.3, 2009), Dok Ruk Rim Tan 
(ดอกรกัริมทาง – Ch. 5, 2010), Ngao Kammathep (เงากามเทพ – Ch.7, 2010), Coffee Prince (คอฟฟ่ีปรินซ์ ไทย 
TrueVisions, 2012); Lakorn with heterosexual male characters dressing up as women: Khun Mae Jum Lang 
(คณุแมจ่ าแลง – Ch.3, 2009).TrueVisions, 2012); Lakorn with heterosexual male characters dressing up as women: 
Khun Mae Jum Lang (คณุแมจ่ าแลง – Ch.3, 2009). 
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film, there has never been a lakorn in which the main lead is a queer character. In mid-2009, Prajan 
See Roong (พระจนัทร์สีรุง้, The Rainbow Moon – Ch.3) was a top rated soap that prominently 
featured a katoey character who was not in the typical comedic role for the entirety of its run. But 
the katoey in question sacrifices his/her transgender identity and lives as an effeminate man in 
order to provide his adopted son with a better family environment.122 The queer character is once 
again pacified and recast to fall within Thai standards on family values and public identity. Later 
in the year, Proong Nee Kor Ruk Ter (พรุง่น้ีก็รกัเธอ, Tomorrow, I’ll Still Love You – Ch.5) 
followed the budding romantic relationship between its two supporting male characters, both of 
whom were neither katoey or effeminate. Their homosexual courtship, however, was told through 
a storyline of unrequited love growing into mutual attraction, implying that the definitive struggle 
of male homosexual romance is not social stigmatization but a simple matter of recognizing one’s 
own feelings. 
 
Illustration 3.1: Actor Aof Pongpat in the role of a katoey in Prajan See Roong 
                                                          
122 Kang, 176.  
The katoey character is played by Aof Pongpat Wachirabunjong whose son in the lakorn is played by Bie Sukrit. Aof 
Pongpat won the award for best supporting actor in a lakorn for this role at the first annual Nataraja Awards, Star 
Entertainment Awards, and the Kom Chad Leuk Awards. Coincidently, Aof is the director of the hit film Me...Myself 
(2008) in which the male lead, Tan, loses his memory and eventually discovers that he is in fact a katoey. The ending 
of the film suggests that gender is not biologically determined, but socially constructed since Tan was constantly 
exposed to the katoey lifestyle during his upbringing. Viewers are led to believe that Tan will willingly pursue a 
heterosexual life with his female love interest. 
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Despite the developments beyond the stereotypical queer character, portrayals of katoey 
and gay men seem to only make it as far as major supporting roles. Furthermore, for gay male 
characters to have substantial airtime, their homosexuality is often kept secret or underplayed on 
screen.123 Female homosexuality is almost completely absent from the lakorn. Producers exercise 
self-censorship when they typecast the gay or transgender character to adhere to a certain pattern 
of queer representation on screen. Male and female homosexuality is subsumed under a 
heteronormative narrative trajectory that has yet to cast queer characters as leads. This relegation 
of queerness into marginal spaces on Thai soaps unveils another facet of state television 
censorship. Censorship in the Thai context is not the explicit prohibition of an inventory of 
specified images and sounds. At times, it is invisible and untraceable. Censorship does not consist 
of the cutting out or exclusion of queer characters but it is rather embedded in incongruous but 
authoritative systems of social norms and expectations that actually allows for the inclusion of 
standardized queer images. Consequently, queerness does exist in lakorn but in a normalized form 
and only in the periphery as in Thai society. 
To the Skies 
 The key “figures” of any social process, formation or revolution can offer insights into its 
ideological foundations and their contestations. Figures, as persons who encourage reflexive 
contemplation about the world in which they live, embody local and national discourses about 
contemporary social life and its future. They mark the contextualized manifestations of a particular 
historical moment and its given large-scale processes, structures of feeling, and symbolic 
                                                          
123 Lakorn with gay male characters: Botan Kleep Sudtai (โบต ั๋นกลีบสดุทา้ย – Ch.3, 2008), Jai Rao (ใจรา้ว - Ch. 3, 
2008), Plerng See Roong (เพลิงสรีุง้ – Ch.3, 2009), Qi Pao (กีเ่พา้ - Ch.3, 2013) 
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significations.124 A Thai figure of femininity can therefore provide insight into the social 
experiences, historical currents, and affective regimes of modern womanhood in the country. In 
her discussion of the lived reality of female Thai Airways flight attendants, Jane Ferguson argues 
that they occupy this liminal structural role in Thai modernity. While they stand for the country’s 
pace in terms of technological advances in air travel, they also promote traditionalism by wearing 
bright uniforms with the Thai sarong and sash. While they are recruited disproportionately from 
Bangkok’s upper middle class and highly educated, they are explicitly objectified and eroticized 
in advertisement campaign slogans like “Smooth as Silk” and “We love you as much as heaven.” 
As a marketed icon of and for Thai femininity, female flight attendants especially must contend 
with the many complexities of gender, class and emotional work.125 In other words, modern Thai 
femininity has been instilled on and advertised through the figure of the female flight attendant. 
This figure comes attached with its own assumptions and strains on the affective disposition of 
real Thai women working in cabins in the skies. Their simultaneous objectification and iconization 
makes their portrayal in lakorn a point of contention.  
The public outrage over the portrayal of female flight attendants in Songkram Nangfah, 
with which I opened this chapter, illustrates these very tensions. Songkram Nangfah was originally 
a story by Royreudee Kenny. Going by a pen name, Airkee, she wrote an autobiographical account 
of her former life as an air stewardess and posted it on Pantip. Her writing titled “My Melancholic 
Life – True Story from the Computer” was an instant online hit and turned into a novel in March 
2007.126 Exact received her consent to turn the 200-page bestseller into a lakorn for Channel 5. 
                                                          
124 Joshua Barker, Erik Harms, and Johan Lindquist, “Introduction,” in Figures of Southeast Asia (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2014), 1-3. 
125 Jane M. Ferguson, “Thailand,” in Figures of Southeast Asia, ed. Joshua Barker, Erik Harms, and Johan Lindquist 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014), 118-119 
126 Mayuree Sukyingcharoenwong, “Angels on warpath,” The Nation, March 13, 2008. 
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Songkram Nangfah follows Rin, a 21-year-old beautiful flight attendant for Mekla Air. She begins 
to fall for the subtle charms of a senior pilot, In. His displays of affection for her spark the furious 
wrath of her work rival and nemesis, Noi, who had long set her eyes on In. Meanwhile, Ning, also 
a pilot in the same airline, explores his growing attraction to Rin who he sees as the next target of 
his philandering wiles. He pursues her despite his ongoing relationship with Rin’s close friend and 
colleague, Gib. To make matters even worse, In is finalizing a bitter divorce with his wife, whose 
rage and resentment land squarely on Rin as the new woman caught in the middle of their failing 
marriage.127 Despite her innocence, Rin’s life is relentlessly complicated by the devious ploys and 
hysteric theatrics of these female characters.  
 
Illustration 3.2: Promotional poster for Songkram Nangfah which stars Bee Namthip 
Jongrachatawiboon as Rin, Kong Saharat Sangkapricha as In and Pong Nawat Kulrattanarak as 
Ning  
 
The title of the lakorn translates literally as “War of the Angels.” This strategic choice of 
words by the producers demonstrates their conflation of the grace and beauty of angels to that of 
Thai female stewardesses. But the irony is that the angels of Mekla Air are not entangled in a 
                                                          
127 “Ruang Yaw Lakorn Songkram Nangfah [Synopsis of War of the Angels],” Kapook!, accessed February 19, 2014 
<http://drama.kapook.com/view26805.html>. 
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ferocious war with demons and devils but with each other. Both the popularity and condemnation 
of the lakorn are driven by the decadence of sex and sexuality on screen. The excess of sexualized 
activities materialized in the form of female air hostesses prancing around in short skirts and 
engaging in fits of derogatory name-calling and fierce face-slapping all in the pursuit of romantic 
love. Viewers are introduced to the character of Noi when she chastises and physically bullies Rin 
during their very first encounter. They meet In’s wife when she chances upon Rin and her husband 
exchanging loving gazes and soft caresses at the airport. She proceeds to cause a public raucous to 
condemn Rin for deliberately being a homewrecker. When Gib grows distrustful of Ning’s 
attentiveness to Rin, she takes it out on Rin through a manic episode of verbal defamation and 
accusation in between incessant hair-pulling, pushing and slapping. The maliciousness between 
the women at war occurred in only the first five episodes.  
 
Illustration 3.3: Catfight scene between Rin and Noi (Episode 5) 
 
The union was horrified by this damning and damaging characterization of their flight 
crews, asserting that this kind of conduct never happens. In the meeting to discuss their plan to 
elicit the interference of the Ministry of Culture, officials expressed concerns that such pejorative 
scenes will discourage people from choosing this line of work since the show ignored the safety 
and customer service work done by flight crews. Besides petitioning the Ministry of Culture to 
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take action on the steamy drama, the livid union implored Thai airlines’ executives to withdraw 
their sponsorship if Exact fail to meet their demands that the story be adjusted to be less suggestive 
that the characters represented real airline staff. The producer, however, believed that the lakorn 
reflected all sides of the profession, albeit more dramatized.128 The negotiations between the union 
and the production company hinged on a dispute on two interconnected issues: the realism of the 
lakorn and the moral depravity of its characters. The debate was about whether or not the sinful 
behavior of the characters, mainly the women, was depicted in a distorted, unrealistic light.  
It seems astonishing that Channel 5 elected to resolve the scandal by simply lengthening 
the skirts worn by the female flight attendants in the lakorn without much change to the story or 
its allusions. Despite their superficiality, surfaces in Thailand matter quite a bit. These surfaces are 
gendered and easily transformed through presentations and everyday practices that focus on 
women as visual icons. Gendered practices such as beauty contests fetishize national images which 
serve to exoticize and reify the essence of Thainess in order to enhance the country’s international 
reputation and tourist appeal.129 It is not just inner beauty that counts. Standards of physical beauty 
for Thai women have become ever more demanding. The marketing of female Thai beauty in the 
global consumer culture has continually created new paragons of beauty. The Eurasian face is 
admired on Thai television and in beauty pageants. Advertisements in glossy magazines show a 
clear preference for models who are light-skinned with Eurasian features as a kind of pan-Asian 
standard of beauty.130 Therefore, beautiful surfaces matter even more. Penny Van Esterik believes 
that “the moral power of beauty and the extreme objectification of women intersect in 
contemporary Thailand.” Internal attributes such as gentleness, subservience, and virtue are 
                                                          
128 “Soap has Thai crew in a lather,” BBC News, January 21, 2008.  
When Songkram Nangfah was exported to China, many of the scenes with a gay male character were edited out. 
129 Van Esterik, 4. 
130 Craig J. Reynolds, “Predicaments of Modern Thai History,” South East Asian Research 2.1 (1993): 75. 
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configured into a construction of external beauty that stresses grace and composure.131 With this 
in mind, the toning down of the exposure of skin and the frequency of catfights might not be that 
baffling. Its purpose was to keep up appearances in the sense of minimizing the severity of the 
situation at hand and of upholding the cultural models of feminine beauty.  
At the end of its 34-episode run, the show pulled in ratings as high as 12, an incredible feat 
for Channel 5. But the gossip did not stop there. The fictional Rin married Ning after an unplanned 
pregnancy only to catch him in a long-term affair with his mistress, Cherry. The real Rin, the 
author of the original book, divorced her husband after years of marriage. He went on to marry the 
woman with whom he was committing adultery. Following the airing of Songkram Nangfah, the 
author ignited another media firestorm by posting old photographs of that woman, who was 
assumed to be the real-life Cherry, on the internet. Her actions led to her arrest and a subsequent 
legal battle.132 This was an ill-conceived attempt by the author to insinuate that the story which 
inspired the lakorn stayed true to her own personal life of hardship and heartbreak at the hands of 
immoral others. 
The sensationalization of the entire ordeal underscores the thin line between reality and 
drama. What was (over)acting was construed as real. What was real was turned into entertainment. 
The spectacle of it all was grounded on the fatality of feminine sexuality and sexual desires. The 
public controversy of Songkram Nangfah revealed the existing contestations of Thai gender 
politics. The problem and its immediate resolution rested on skirt length and the number of 
jealousy-induced rages among the women in the drama. The call for intervention to the Ministry 
of Culture highlights how the lakorn has become a space of cultural expression but one that 
requires scrutiny and supervision. Censorship is not a coherent and cohesive enterprise. There is a 
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multiplicity of actors at play to make demands and claims about their representation on screen. 
This particular scenario illustrates how the state, producers and spectators meet at the censor 
interface to negotiate the boundaries of appropriate feminine decorum. By the end of the quarrel 
surrounding Songkram Nangfah, the lesson learned is not to complicate prevailing perceptions on 
femininity but to temporarily mitigate the occasional public uproar. Lakorn can show skin and 
slaps, but not so gratuitously as to challenge conventions of female propriety and modesty. 
Career Promiscuity 
The conceptualization of the figure of a Thai man and woman is inextricably interlaced 
with aspects of Theravada Buddhism. Charles Keyes argues that the Thai Buddhist world is built 
and upheld by fundamental doctrines communicated through rituals, the teachings of the Buddha 
and practices. This Buddhist world view delineates a culture of gender in Thailand that 
distinguishes between males and females on account of given attributes. He identifies the dominant 
image of a Thai woman in popular Buddhist texts as that of a mother whose “natural” role is 
primarily as nurturer of her family and of Buddhist institutions through her ritual activities and 
giving birth to sons who will become monks.133 Thomas Kirsch alternatively discusses the Thai 
division of labor and Buddhist sex roles through a general property that men and women share in 
common: degree of attachment. He concluded that “women are deemed to be more firmly rooted 
in their worldly attachments than are men, men are thought to be more ready to give up such 
attachment.”134 Despite their disagreements, both authors suggest that core values embodied in 
Buddhism such as attachment, merit, karma, and morality have strikingly configured themselves 
onto normative understandings of Thai sex roles and gender culture.  
                                                          
133 Charles Keyes, “Mother or Mistress, but Never a Monk: Buddhist Notions of Female Gender in Rural Thailand,” 
American Ethnologists 11.2 (May 1984): 223-227. 
134 A. Thomas Kirsch, “Text and Context: Buddhist Sex Roles/Culture of Gender Revisited,” American Ethnologist 
12.2 (May 1985): 303-304. He draws from his previous work (Kirsch 1975) to contrast with Keyes’ findings. 
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If contradictory views on the natural roles of men and women are nevertheless underpinned 
by principles governing a Thai Buddhist world as envisioned by its believers, it is not surprising 
when Dok Som See Thong (ดอกสม้สทีอง – Ch.3, 2011) both enthralled and repulsed viewers. Dok 
Som See Thong was the highly popular sequel to Mongkut Dok Som (มงกุฎดอกสม้ - Ch.3, 2010), 
both of which were originally novels by Taitao Sucharitakul (ถา่ยเถา สจุรติกุล) under the same titles. 
Mongkut Dok Som achieved moderate success with its tales of the quarrels and misfortunes within 
a multi-generational Chinese magnate family under its 60-year-old prideful patriarch, Cheng Seu 
Kiang. He is a powerful businessman whose fear of aging and loss of prestige compels him to seek 
out young wives. His latest wife is Kumkaew, a desolate girl who marries him at the age of 15. 
Her dream of a blissful marital life is deferred only momentarily until the arrival of the oldest son, 
Kongkiat. The lakorn is about the trials of Kumkaew’s and Kongkiat’s love due to its seeming 
impossibility and taboo. The storyline is also anchored in the scheming, deceit and conflict 
between the first two wives for control over family affairs.135 Dok Som See Thong premiered less 
than two months after the end of its prequel and launched a Thai social craze coined under the 
namesake of the female lead character. The fixation on the lakorn by audiences and censor officials 
was fittingly called the Reya Phenomenon (ปรากฏการณ์เรยา).136 
From its very first episode, Dok Som See Thong proved to be pushing the envelope with 
the explicitness of Reya’s sexual escapades. The story follows her endeavor to escape poverty by 
sleeping with as many men as necessary. Reya initially stays with her mother who is a live-in 
                                                          
135 “Lakorn Mongkut Dok Som [Drama Orange Blossom Crown],” THAITV3, accessed March 1, 2014 
<http://www.thaitv3.com/เรือ่งยอ่ละคร/109/มงกุฎดอกสม้.html>. 
136 The Reya phenomenon continued even after the success of the lakorn when Chompoo Araya won the award for 
best leading actress in a lakorn for her portrayal of Reya at the 3rd Nataraja Awards. She then reprised her role in the 
stage production, Reya: The Musical which played at the Aksra Theatre at the King Power Complex from September 
to October of 2012 - “Pon rang wan Nataraja krang thi 3 [Results of the 3rd Nataraja Awards],” Rakdara, May 21, 
2012, accessed March 1, 2014 <http://rakdara.net/overview.php?c=2&id=25443>; “Reaching Out to Reya,” The 
Nation, September 14, 2012. 
 
 
68 
 
servant for a Caucasian couple. She repeatedly ignores her mother’s advice and rudely complains 
about her mother’s lowly social status. Her thirst for easy fortune motivates her to apply for a 
position coincidently as a flight attendant for Siam Airlines in order to snag the married Sing, the 
airline’s Director of Human Resources. She soon discovers that Sing was under financial 
constraints due to the suspicions of his wife, who as the only daughter of an affluent and influential 
baron was the actual wealthy person. When Reya realizes that Sing was no longer a viable option, 
she moves onto Yai or Kongkiat, the eldest married son of Cheng and his first wife. She deviously 
seduces him under a façade of innocent infatuation. Though Yai takes care of her after her 
pregnancy with his first child, he continues to stay married to his wife. Reya holds onto to him in 
hopes of having her son be legally instated as the first grandson and main inheritor of the Cheng 
family fortune in the future. Since Yai shows hesitance, she meets and dates the handsome CK. 
Little does she know that CK happens to be the son of Cheng and his third wife and is planted by 
Yai, his older half-brother, to test her sincerity.137 
 
Illustration 3.4: Promotional poster for Dok Som See Thong starring Chompoo Araya Hargate as 
Reya and as Aun Witaya Wasukraipaisarn as Khun Yai (Kongkiat) 
                                                          
137 “Lakorn Dok Som See Thong [Drama Golden Orange Blossom],” THAITV3, accessed March 1, 2014  
<http://www.thaitv3.com/ละคร/122/ดอกสม้สทีอง.html>. 
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From start to finish, Reya uses her body as a source of livelihood in her desperate search 
for riches and status. In the midst of airing, Dok Som See Thong incited widespread social criticism 
for its unabashed exhibitionism of her sexual exploits. Ladda Tangsupachai, the Director of the 
Cultural Surveillance Center (ศนูย์การเฝ้าระวงัทางวฒันธรรม กระทรวงวฒันธรรม) under the Ministry 
of Culture, came out to issue a statement after the Ministry’s hotline 1765 was flooded with 
complaints from alarmed parents asking the Ministry to examine the lakorn for content that might 
be inappropriate for children and youth. She summarized their distress as predicated on Reya’s 
lack of respect for her mother and her sleeping around with different men. The Center could not 
step in at this point because Channel 3 did not violate any regulations insofar as issuing a rating of 
N 13+ for its broadcast. Ladda confirmed that the report was forwarded to the Minister of Culture, 
Nipit Intarasombut, for further investigation.138 Channel 3 stated that they could not change the 
storyline because the entire lakorn was already in post-production and scheduled to air. Bowing to 
the backlash, the channel raised the content rating to 18+ and deleted several scenes to avoid 
another round of critique. The Minister of Culture examined the report and issued a follow-up 
statement in which he said that even a rating of 50+ would not solve the problem of children 
sneaking to watch the drama.139  
The portrayal of Reya as cunning mistress was at the root of the obsession and disgust with 
Dok Som See Thong. Her adept duplicity in presenting herself as a pitiful, naïve woman hides her 
complete disregard for morality. The “Reya Phenomenon,” a term used by the press, fans and 
                                                          
138 “Sai duan thaep mai at ‘Reya’ lae phor mae rong khor ra ngap [The hotline was scorched and jammed, ‘Reya’ 
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critics, attests to the disproportionate amount of attention paid to the character or more precisely, 
to her careerist promiscuity and its repercussions for the youth segment of the viewing audience. 
Keyes argues that Thai women are not inevitably bound by their passionate attachments to the 
world, but can recognize the truth of Buddha’s teaching about suffering through their own 
experiences of loss.140 Even women who work as prostitutes can evoke the traditional image of 
woman as nurturing mother because they may be constrained by conditions beyond their control.141 
This suggests that women are not inherently flawed but are willed by their circumstances to sin. 
The possibility of this interpretation by viewers of the soap is nullified by the fact that Reya lack 
such recognition. Reya’s own dissatisfaction with her social and financial standing propels her to 
sin. The definitive objective of her schemes is material wealth. Such worldly attachments compel 
her to privilege her own desires over the losses of others. On this self-destructive path, Reya does 
not show guilt in destroying families and friendships as she lies and cheats to get her way. In the 
crudest words, Reya was eagerly honing her craft as a professional homewrecker. Naturally, this 
did not receive rave endorsement from conservative parents and cultural policy officials.  
Dok Som See Thong elucidates this double standard between female wantonness and male 
philandering. The Cheng patriarch lusts for young wives despite the damage inflicted on his 
family. However, his polygamy, his son’s incest142 and the adultery committed by several male 
characters in both installations were not the impetuses for scandal and censorship. Only when Reya 
is presented as sexually loose are her misdeeds perceived as destructive to stability and sanctity of 
the Thai family in the lakorn and blasphemous for the Thai families watching.  
                                                          
140 Keyes, 232. 
141 Keyes, 237. 
142 In the conclusion of Mongkut Dok Som, Kumkaew goes mentally insane after witnessing Yai, her own lover, 
sleeping with one of his father’s wives and also another man while in a drunken state. 
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The consolidation of an ideal model of the Thai family occurred under the reign of Rama 
VI. Legal reformers and King Vajiravudh himself endeavored to standardize Siam’s institution of 
the family through print media and legal codes.143 Linked to a larger state-building project, the 
“crisis of wifedom” engendered new discourses on the modern family and proper female sexuality. 
Siamese nationalism was propagated with a moral conception of family largely defined by 
“heterosexual sexual practices within a long-term martial union.” Women were supposed to be 
good mothers who raised their sons to be honest, polite and good husbands in the future. Women 
who did not act according to the newly legitimated roles in the family were condemned under the 
new dogma of national belonging. The stabilization of the monogamous heterosexual union as the 
ideal and identifiable family union anchored Thai national identity.144 Inscribed onto Reya is a 
wide-ranging set of social, cultural, and religious expectations under a standard of the Thai family. 
In this case, censorship took the form of pressure on the producers to meet these expectations.  
Once her deceit is exposed, Reya is castigated and ostracized for her lack of virtue. Yai’s 
wife, Narudee, replaces Reya as the mother figure for his son. The first grandson is ceremoniously 
presented to the Cheng household that is shaken from past trials but ready to move on. Only when 
she is abandoned and alone at the very end does Reya begin to realize her selfishness, greed and 
faults. The closing montage displayed scenes in which various characters voice their opinions 
about the requirements of a respectable marriage. The last scene of the lakorn is a segment 
featuring a leading Thai Buddhist monk, Phra Maha Vudhijaya Vajiramedhi, preaching about how 
to watch Dok Som See Thong in order to learn from its messages about familial relationships and 
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values.145 The clear Buddhist overtones of this extended ending sequence suggests that efforts to 
censor Dok Som See Thong aimed to maintain the parameters of acceptable roles for women in the 
family, marriage and society. Censorship acted as a yardstick for the appropriate bounds of 
feminine desires and Thai family values that could appear on screen.  
 
Illustration 3.5: Left – Ending where Reya is sobbing alone (Episode 16); Right – Monk 
explaining how to watch Dok Som See Thong with a critical mind 
 
Faith and Farang 
 Fah Jarod Sai (ฟ้าจรดทราย - Ch.7, 2013) is the latest lakorn to be tested at the censor 
interface. While this scandal again revolved around the main female protagonist, this case was an 
intriguing departure from the previous two. Based on a novel by the prolific writer Sopak Suwan, 
Fah Jarod Sai is an epic adventure story of a mixed-race orphan traveling from a convent in France 
to a foreign Arab land to prove her own self-worth. Michelle de la Roni is abandoned by her 
relatives because of her mixed blood and is raised by Catholic nuns. After finishing college in 
Paris, Michelle de la Roni follows her best friend, Kashfiya, who heads home to the distant desert 
kingdom of Hilfara. Michelle teaches French to children at the same school set up by Kashfiya in 
her family’s mansion. King Ahmed, Sultan of Hilfara, believes Kasfiya to be the woman who will 
                                                          
145 For more information about this well-known monk (พระมหาวุฒชิยั วชิรเมธี): 
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bear him his first heir as foretold by the royal soothsayer.  Kashfiya devises a plan to send Michelle 
as a substitute bride in fear that Michelle will steal her French lover who has also come to Hilfara. 
After Michelle’s arrival at the palace, Oman, a relative of the King, stages an uprising to usurp the 
throne for himself. Believing that King Ahmed is dead, Sharif, a royal officer and confidant of the 
King, flees into the desert with Michelle to escape the rebel army. Fah Jarod Sai focuses on their 
many hardships while trying to survive in the grueling desert.146 The author had spent some time 
living in the Middle East to do research for this book which was first published in 1974 and has 
since been reprinted on several occasions. Before hitting the small screen, it was made into a stage 
musical in 2007.147 Despite previous successes in print and on stage, the story was problematic in 
its lakorn interpretation. After the first four episodes were broadcasted, Fah Jarod Sai because the 
cause of major tension between channel executives, state bodies and religious groups as all sides 
deliberated over the adequate mode of censorship. 
 
 
Illustration 3.6: Promotional poster for Fah Jarod Sai which stars Kwan Usamanee Vaithayanon 
as Michelle de la Roni, Tui Teerapat Satjakul as Sharif, and Aimee Morakot Kittisara as Kashfiya 
                                                          
146 “Ruang Yaw Fah Jarod Sai [Synopsis of Fah Jarod Sai],” Channel 7, accessed March 1, 2014 
<http://drama.ch7.com/detail/41238/ฟ้าจรดทราย.html>. 
147 “Fah Jarod Sai [Where the Sky Meets the Sand],” Goodreads, accessed April 2, 2014 
<http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/3366620-1-2. 
For more on the musical: http://www.rachadalai.com/fahjarodsai/>; Sopak Suwan (โสภาค สุวรรณ(, penname of 
Rampaipan Suwarnasarn Srisopark (ร าไพพรรณ สวุรรณสาร), was named one of Thailand’s National Artist in 2013.  
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 On August 22, 2013, the Muslims for Peace Foundation, an Islamic advocacy group based 
in Bangkok, filed a petition to have Fah Jarod Sai taken off air. In their document handed to 
Bangkok Broadcasting and Television (BBTV), the Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) Minister, Mr. Anudith Nakornthap, and the National Broadcast and Telecommunications 
Commission (NBTC), the Muslim group claimed that the lakorn misrepresents the Islamic religion 
and defames its practitioners. Fai Jarod Sai allegedly distorts the teachings of Islam and 
disrespects and ridicules its believers. The drama misleads viewers into thinking that Islam 
condones cruelty to women and children. The group is particularly incensed by the depiction of 
Hilfara as an Islamic kingdom that restricts its Muslim women from receiving an education which 
is contrary to Muslim belief. The Foundation believes this could have widespread and 
unpredictable effects on Muslims if the NBTC do not order its cancellation.148  
Fah Jarod Sai was a large project under DaraDVO that took over three years in the making 
due to unforeseen hindrances in casting, production costs, and scheduling.149 So when it finally 
aired, Channel 7 was reluctant to cancel this expensive show in fear of losing its returns on the 
investment. The channel responded a few days later in defense of its production. After receiving 
the complaint from the Foundation, Bangkok Broadcast Television (BBTV), which operates 
Channel 7 under a commission by the Royal Thai Army, issued a statement affirming that they 
had no intention to insult Islam or its followers. Managing director of BBTV, Palakon Somsuwan, 
explained that the company conducted a review and decided to move forward with the airing. The 
broadcaster insisted that the aim was to remain faithful to the original novel in its portrayal of 
                                                          
148 “Muslim group want soap opera axed,” Bangkok Post, August 23, 2013. 
149 “Aaathan Fah Jarod Sai 10 pii haeng kaan ror khoy [Magical Fah Jarod Sai 10 years of waiting],” Komchadluek, 
February 7, 2011, accessed March 10, 2014 
<http://www.komchadluek.net/detail/20110207/88075/อาถรรพณ์‘ฟ้าจรดทราย’กวา่10ปีแหง่การรอคอย.html#.Ux-
eXPmwLl0>. 
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fictional events for the purpose of entertainment. The production company, DaraVDO, reiterated 
those sentiments and added that it had submitted the scripts of all twelve episodes translated into 
English to the Egyptian embassy and the Culture Ministry of Egypt for examination before 
filming.150 The reaction on both sides was centered on the question of religious authenticity.  
Accuracy in religious representation was lodged once more in the depiction of the conduct 
and agency of (Muslim) women. In Fah Jarod Sai, Michelle and Kashfiya are character foils of 
each other. Kashfiya, an Islamic woman, is corrupted by the freedom she experiences while 
studying abroad. She defies her faith when she takes on a French lover, Robert, and invites him to 
continue their intimate relationship in her homeland. When she suspects Michelle as the reason for 
Robert’s change of heart, Kashfiya takes the opportunity to send her friend to the royal palace, 
knowing that Michelle will likely face a death sentence for attempted espionage or insurgency. 
Michelle, on the other hand, is reserved, studious, well-mannered and considerate. But as a French 
citizen and practicing Catholic, it is difficult for her to accept the religious foundations of her new 
setting. Her Otherness in terms of faith and nationality is repeatedly noted and juxtaposed against 
a male-dominated Arab kingdom. She is told to wear the Muslim headdress and cover her face 
when she sees men approaching. She is taught that men and women live separately in Hilfara 
because women and children have little say in the choices in life. She witnesses acts of gender 
violence on women and their silent compliancy. She is reminded that women are persecuted, 
sometimes by public stoning, for transgressions against the orthodox Islamic way. Using these 
tropes of female oppression under Islam, Fah Jarod Sai could not bypass the censor interface. 
                                                          
150 “Channel 7 defends ‘Arab’ soup,” Bangkok Post, August 24, 2013. 
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Illustration 3.7: Michelle witnesses instances of punishment and violence levied on Muslim 
women in Hilfara (Episode 1-2) 
 
The solution was to revise the script and production of the remaining eight episodes. 
Experts from the Sheikhul Islam Office (จุฬาราชมนตรี) met with the producers to review the script 
to ensure that the rest of the lakorn accurately depicted the Muslim religion and culture.151  The 
lakorn was eventually slimmed down to eleven episodes.152 The case of Fah Jarod Sai does not 
represent a direct compromise or concession, but surprisingly, a collaboration of sorts at the censor 
interface. Despite its emphasis on the positionality of women in Islam, censorship resulted not in 
an evaluation of their conditions of autonomy or lack thereof. Rather, it was a joint attempt by 
state officials, religious leaders and television executives to shed more positive light on patriarchy 
under Islam. Seen in this way, the collaboration was a public relations campaign to carve out a 
polished representation of the Muslim faith. 
 
                                                          
151 “Experts to help show reflect Islam,” Bangkok Post, August 25, 2013. 
152 After suffering many trials traveling with Sharif through the desert, Michelle finds herself in the throes of death. 
Michelle and Sharif are able to reunite with King Admed who is in fact alive and has defeated Oman’s army forces. 
Once at the palace, Michelle recovers from her ailments. With the country still shaken from the rebellion, Sharif feels 
obliged to serve the throne and rebuild Hilfara. But as royalty, he must marry a woman from Hilfara and appoint her 
as his queen. Michelle does not want to pressure him into giving up his title and avoiding his duty to the country. She 
decides to return to France. In the end, however, King Admed acknowledges the extent of their love and grant their 
marriage. The pair have a lavish wedding and together help to bring peace and progress to Hilfara.  
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Conclusion: It’s a Man’s World 
Soaps and femininity have been in a dialectical relationship from the onset. Arguably, 
soaps and feminism have too. Post-1960s second-wave feminism in the United States saw the 
emergence of key texts such as Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique, Germaine Greer’s The 
Female Eunuch, and Sheila Rowbotham’s Women’s Consciousness, Man’s World that raised 
concerns about the ways in which women are represented. In the following decades, the growth of 
mass produced genres of femininity such as the romance fiction, film melodrama, “weepies,” 
women’s magazines, and of course, the television soap opera have sparked the interests of many 
feminist scholars.153 Charlotte Brunsdon and those before her asks the simple question: Why were 
feminists interested in the soap opera?  
Since its inception as U.S. radio serials, the soap opera has been a woman’s genre, marketed 
specifically at female audiences. A structural shift in the field of western feminist studies in the 
1970s then launched the slogan of “the personal is political.” This theoretical impulse pushed 
feminist research to examine not the exceptional, but the everyday and how women’s intimate 
oppression in the home, relationships and families was consensually secured. The crucial object 
of study was then the media construction and representation of women’s personal lives.154 The 
feminist encounter with the soap opera shepherded a new phase of feminist media scholarship that 
explores the interwoven relationship between the figure of the woman and a feminized genre. The 
soap thus became a central site for investigating the gendered nature of television media.  
But gender categories and representations have not been the crux of the Thai women’s 
movement. Since its birth alongside the students’ movement in the mid-1970s, the women’s 
                                                          
153 Charlotte Brunsdon, “The role of soap opera in the development of feminist television scholarship,” in To Be 
Continued…: Soap Operas around the world, ed. Robert C. Allen (New York: Routledge, 1995), 50-51. 
154 Brunsdon, 58-59. 
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movement in Thailand has struggled with being in the shadows of student activism and against 
state ideologies.155 Feminism in Thailand as an academic theory and social movement aims more 
to alter gender inequality and oppression in society. Feminists advocate for the inclusion of women 
in the positions of decision-making in conjunction with their liberation from the unequal power 
structures. But the women’s movement was and is by no means free from differences in theoretical 
stances and forms of engagement. Some demand higher pay and safer work environments. Many 
are concerned with the “glass ceiling” preventing the advancement of women in organizations and 
politics. Others stress the need for equal political and legal rights and protection against sexual 
violence. Women’s groups target problems such as prostitution, sex tourism, and HIV/AIDS. 156 
Thus, feminism in the Thai context is configured by a diverse set of issues. Still, more attention 
needs to be paid to the lakorn for its fair share of scandalizing the images of women. 
 The cases presented in this chapter paint a convoluted portrait of censorship. Censorship 
of soaps that diverge from conventional notions about gender roles and sexual desires has been 
instigated by various groups and emerged in various forms. The common thread is the scrutiny of 
the feminine and effeminate bodies. The censorship of homosexuality and transgenderism in 
lakorn manifests in the normalization and marginalization of queer bodies. The censorship of 
feminine desires and sexual freedom in lakorn manifests in the re-subjugation of female bodies 
under overarching cultural and religious paradigms. Censorship is the maintenance of a gendered 
status quo. The implications of this status quo is conveyed by the following caricature of the 
trendiness of rape in lakorn:  
[The main male lead] is so angry and frustrated with the woman he wrongly takes to be "bad" 
and so rapes her in order to "punish" her. Only when he finds out that the victim is actually 
                                                          
155 Van Esterik, 49-50. 
156 Chalidaporn Songsamphan, "Localizing Feminism: Women's Voices and Social Activism in Thai Context," Gunda 
Werner Institute, March, 9, 2011, accessed April 1, 2014 <http://www.gwi-boell.de/en/2011/03/09/localizing-
feminism-women%E2%80%99s-voices-and-social-activism-thai-context>.  
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good and innocent (a virgin, too) does he fall in love with her and tries to win her heart through 
many travails. It's also typical that the female loves him back, disregarding the man's anger 
management problem. Then it's a happy ending.157  
 
While the lakorn draws in a majority female audience, the lakorn world view is not envisioned in 
their favor. Instead, the world of the lakorn is a young and successful straight man’s world. Thus, 
like with the American soap opera, a feminist or critical reading of the Thai lakorn also has to 
recognize the gendered nature of television media and the problematic figure of the woman within 
the soap genre in order to further problematize issues of female and queer subjectivity, 
representation, and agency.  
                                                          
157 Ploenpote Atthakor, “Condoning rape in Thai TV drama,” Bangkok Post, January 23, 2008. 
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Chapter 4 
Exposing the Defects: 
Political Sentiments and Sensibilities under Surveillance 
 
As the previous chapter has shown, a variety of actors are intentionally and unintentionally 
embroiled in the act of censorship. When called upon to intervene, state censorship officials 
deliberate each case individually and deploy various tactics to resolve the conflict at hand. Most 
soaps easily make it past all three levels of censorship. Those that push the boundaries possibly 
subject themselves to a higher content rating and forced edits. Viewers are familiar with this pattern 
despite its elusiveness. An incident in early 2013 however changed lakorn censorship in a way that 
few had anticipated. The sudden banning of Nuer Mek 2 (เหนือเมฆ 2: มอืปราบขมงัเวทย์ – Ch.3, 
2012) made headline news in Thailand. The fact that the whole affair was shrouded in secrecy 
added to the controversy. The lakorn might have violated Section 37 of the 2008 Radio and 
Television Broadcasting Business Act which prohibits content that seeks to overthrow the 
constitutional monarchy, threatens national security or morality, constitutes obscenity or harms 
people’s mental or physical health.158 Nuer Mek 2 thus became a test case for the limits of voicing 
political discontent. The ban prompted Vasit Dejkunjorn to personally pen a bitter letter posted on 
Matichon, where he was the Vice President of the Board of Advisors at the time. He wrote in a 
sarcastic tone that he has read the aforementioned legal code and did not see how the violation 
took place no matter how many times he read it.159 Vasit Dejkunjorn is the most well-known 
example of this type of reaction by viewers to the incident: anger, confusion, and disappointment. 
                                                          
158 Radio and Broadcasting Business Act B.E. 2551 (2008), Section 37. 
159 Vasit Dejkunjorn,“Mua kon duu thuk bangkhap May hai duu lakorn toratat [When viewers are prohibited from 
watching television drama],” Matichon Online, January 8, 2013, accessed October 20, 2014 
<http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1357615175&grpid=03&catid=03>. 
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Nuer Mek 2 is distinguished for registering the sternest measure of censorship. It is also 
notable due to the scapegoating and lack of transparency that have worked to cover the truth behind 
the ban to this very day. That is not to say that Nuer Mek 2 pioneered a new form of the lakorn 
genre. It too adopted the general formulaic layout: the courtship between the pra’ek-nang’ek 
pairing, immoral villains stirring up trouble, and plenty of misunderstandings and deceit. The 
missing piece was an uplifting finale. The plotline was heavily premised on the juxtaposition of 
good and evil. The difference this time was that both the good and the evil were being embodied 
by Thai politicians. Like the figure of the female flight attendant, the cunning mistress, the Muslim 
woman, the figure of the Thai politician comes with a problematic set of expectations. Unlike the 
cases in Chapter 3 in which the catalyst for censorship was the supposed inaccuracies and 
exaggerations of the fictional world of a Thai soap opera, Neur Mek 2 was precariously living at 
the edge. Despite its themes of sorcery, it was on the verge of being too realistic. The ban of Nuer 
Mek 2 for its suggestive commentary on Thai politics was the most conspicuous but not the first. 
This chapter presents a very short list of lakorn censored for their perceived references to actual 
political scenarios and persons. Simply put, the drama was getting too close to reality. 
Undoubtedly, Thai politics have evolved tremendously in the past several decades. The 
country transitioned from an authoritarian regime in the early 1970s to civilian democracy in the 
1990s. Along the way, Thailand witnessed military dictatorship, state authoritarianism, communist 
“insurgency”, the aftermath of the Cold War, but also the Thai economic boom, the rise of the 
middle class and the empowerment of civil society.160 But certain defects in the system manage to 
withstand political change, manifesting themselves once in a while within the political lakorn. In 
                                                          
160 Peter Jackson, “Offending Images: Gender and Sexual Minorities, and State Control of the Media in Thailand,” 
in Media Fortunes, Changing Times: ASEAN States in Transition, ed. Russell H.K. Heng (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies 2000), 201. 
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this chapter, I present cases in which lakorn were censored for their check on political authority 
and critique of the Thai government. Censorship is supposed to act as a security barricade that 
purges whatever threatens the political configuration and state legitimacy. This chapter points out 
that censorship, on the contrary, calls even more attention to the defects. Channel 3 claimed that 
the motive behind the ban of Nuer Mek 2 was to elude public criticism and political controversy. 
Instead, their act of self-censorship detonated a surge of controversy and conspiracy onto the 
interface. For better or for worse, the spotlight on the shortcomings of the Thai political system in 
lakorn arouse public sentiments about justice, authority, power, corruption, and the institution of 
law. The censor interface for the political lakorn simultaneously tests politics’ sensitivities and 
spectators’ sensibilities. 
Authority in Check  
 Sarawat Yai (สารวตัรใหญ)่ was the first lakorn targeted for its politicized content. It was 
originally a serial novel written by Vasit Dejkunjorn (พล.ต.อ.วสษิฐ เดชกุญชร), a former police 
officer and author of the Nuer Mek 2 letter almost 20 years later. The story was first published in 
Matichon Weekly Magazine from October 1989 to October 1991.161 The novel was made into a 
lakorn that aired on Channel 7 in 1994. Sarawat Yai was vastly popular with Thai audiences for 
its depiction of the amicable and diligent Police Chief Yai Waeroj (พ.ต.ต.ใหญ ่เวโรจน์). Yai is a 
border patrol policeman (ต ารวจตระเวนชายแดน/ตชด.) who is reassigned to the position of Chief of 
Police at Pra Lan. He is uncertain about his abilities since he only has experience suppressing 
terrorists. Upon his arrival at his new station, he discovers that the area under his jurisdiction is 
dirty and crime-ridden. There is widespread corruption and the policemen are blatantly 
disregarding their duties. With his idealism still intact, Yai proceeds to lead by example by 
                                                          
161 “Sarawat Yai [Chief of Police Yai],” Khaosod, April 29, 2010, accessed March 10, 2014 
<http://www.khaosod.co.th/view_news.php?newsid=TUROamIyd3hOVEk1TURRMU13PT0=>. 
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aggressively fighting the criminals and corrupt policemen roaming the city in order to bring peace 
to Pra Lan.162 Sarawat Yai is a story of a figure of authority gallantly standing up for justice. 
Sarawat Yai is equally a story of the state of injustice and criminality perpetuated by police 
indolence and incompentence. In this respect, the police is both the menace and savior of the city. 
 
Illustration 4.1: Promotional poster for Sarawat Yai starring Likit Eakmongkol as Yai 
This imaging of policemen in the drama sparked a debate between the broadcaster and law 
enforcement officers. Vigorous criticism of Sarawat Yai rested on its explicit and candid portrayal 
of the police. Accusations were launched that the lakorn was disrespecting and destroying the 
image of the Thai police force. Protests from police officers forced Channel 7 to hastily end the 
broadcast after only four episodes despite its high viewership.163 The abrupt and indefinite 
cancellation of the show was never explained by the Royal Thai Army who owned Channel 7. 
                                                          
162 “Sarawat Yai [Chief of Police Yai],” ThailandLakorn, accessed March 10, 2014 
<thailandlakorn.com/สารวตัรใหญ่>. 
163 “Yon Roy…Lakorn-Phapayon ruang thii don baen korn Nuer Mek 2 [Drama-film stories that were banned before 
Nuer Mek 2],” Kapook! accessed March 15, 2014 <http://drama.kapook.com/view53964.html>; Sara Van Fleet, 
“Everyday Dramas; Television and Modern Thai Women” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1998), 34. 
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Police intervention left this case unresolved for viewers who could not watch the lakorn until 
completion. Rumors in the press painted this arbitrary termination of a new TV drama as the result 
of anger and disapproval from government officials to General Vasit’s portrayal of the alliance 
and collusion between the police, the mafia, local politicians and village leaders.164 The 
termination of Sarawat Yai was a retort by the police to an instance in which its authority was 
being questioned. While Police Chief Yai is a heroic character determined to cleanse his city of 
crime and corruption, he must contend with the presence of inept, idle and disreputable officers. 
This plotline unsettles the notion that the principle mandate of the police is to protect the interests 
and welfare of the citizens. Censorship emerges as a mechanism to defend if not avow the ideal 
image of police authority and aptitude. While the television censorship board under the 
Broadcasting Directing Board was abolished after the May 1992 crisis, Sarawat Yai illustrates how 
government threats and pressures were still prevalent in the workings of the industry. 
Channel 7 commissioned another contentious drama following the life of a police officer 
over a decade later. Unfortunately, it never saw the light of day. Back in 2005, Channel 7 purchased 
the copyrights for Tah Du Dao, Thaw Tit Din (ตาดดูาวเทา้ตดิดนิ, Eyes to the Stars, Feet on the 
Ground) from the author, Walaya, and commissioned DaraVDO to turn the book into the channel’s 
first political and biographical lakorn. Based on the real life of Thaksin Shinawatra, the lakorn 
follows his years in the police force and his courtship and marriage to his wife Potjaman before 
the start of his political career. Since there was a proliferation of publications about his life and 
ideologies at the time, Channel 7 intended on catching the “Thaksin tide” (กระแสทกัษิณ).165 The 
                                                          
164 Van Fleet, 34. 
165 “‘Tah Du Dao Thaw Tit Din’ lakorn thuk thing? [‘Eyes to the Stars, Feet on the Ground’ - the drama that was 
thrown away?],” Komchadluek. January 9, 2013, accessed March 15, 2014  
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production was completed in that very year despite allegations of being a propaganda scheme in 
favor of Thaksin, who had just entered his second term as Prime Minster at the time.  
 
 
Illustration 4.2: Promotional poster for Tah Du Dao, Thaw Tit Din which stars Paul Pattapol 
Silapajarn as Thaksin Shinawatra and Jui Warattaya Nilkuha as Potjama 
 
The Thaksin tide, however, was on the wane. Channel 7 was growing wary of the large, 
sporadic protests by Muangthai Rai Sabdah (เมอืงไทยรายสปัดาห์), the predecessor to the People’s 
Alliance for Democracy, as the airdate was quickly approaching. With the looming protests against 
Thaksin’s reelection, the channel was obliged to cancel the broadcast indefinitely.166 Rumors that 
all the tapes where destroyed instead of stored for future broadcast suggests the gravity of the 
situation.167 Political pressures influenced this act of self-censorship by Channel 7. Like with the 
figure of the police, the image and reputation of Thaksin as a figure of great influence and authority 
was being reexamined in a public manner. Amidst the political disorder and friction following the 
2005 general elections, the airing of a lakorn about the very person at the center of the conflict 
                                                          
166 “Pluk pii lakorn ‘Tah Du Dao Thaw Tit Din’ wep Pantip plom phang 7 sii puan [Conjuring drama ‘Tah Du Dao 
Thaw Tit Din’ Pantip fakes announcement on Channel 7 to create misunderstanding],” ASTV Manager, August 26, 
2013, accessed March 10, 2014 <http://www.manager.co.th/Drama/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9560000106796>. 
The book - Walaya (Phumtham Vetchayachai), Thaksin Shinawatra: Tah Du Dao, Thaw Tit Din (Bangkok: Matichon, 
1999). 
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would surely have many detrimental implications for the channel such as being accused of political 
favoritism and inflaming the viewers’ violent urges. The subsequent political turmoil that 
eventually led up to the 2006 coup is indicative of the aptness of Channel 7’s judgment call. 
Above the Clouds 
 
 Since Sarawat Yai, there have been numerous lakorn about the law enforcement officers, 
most depicting the police force in a positive light. From March 16 to May 4, 2010, Channel 3 aired 
a lakorn dealing with Thai police and politics until completion without much incident. While still 
adhering to the typical melodramatic plot structure, Nuer Mek (เหนือเมฆ), an action-suspense 
drama, explored issues of corruption and cronyism without much subtlety. The plotline follows 
the pra’ek, Payu, in his desperate attempt to exonerate himself from a variety of false accusations 
including murder. As he uncovers the truth, Payu encounters government secrets and cover-ups 
that threaten to unravel the entire system and put many other lives at risk. At heart, Nuer Mek is 
another story of good versus evil. It is about political honesty under attack by the perils of rampant 
corruption. It dares to portray the dark side of the deep-seated alliance between business and 
politics in Thailand. Some scenes explicitly depict the outright violence and brutality involved in 
the fight for wealth and power among elite groups in the country. 
Payu is the only child of Meka, a respected, noble politician who raised his son since the 
death of his wife years ago. The father and son have an amicable relationship. Meka is dating 
Napa, the headstrong and self-confident captain of the Special Investigation Unit (TSI) in the 
police force. Napa has a strained relationship with her daughter Fah who works as a computer 
programmer. While Fah resents her mother for being a workaholic, she frequently hacks 
government portals in secret to assist Napa in her detective work. Both Payu and Fah are framed 
for horrible crimes at the same time. At his own graduation party, Payu wakes up after being 
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drugged with a gun in his hands surrounded by the dead bodies of all his friends in attendance. Fah 
is caught hacking and accused of selling hard drugs to minors. While both are innocent, the 
evidence is clearly stacked against them. When they seek help from their parents, both Meka and 
Napa refuse to come to their aid since they are constrained by their position of authority. On their 
way to prison, Payu and Fah successfully escape a hired gunman sent to kill them. Believing that 
their cases are linked, they cooperate to search for the true culprits. They find themselves as 
fugitives from the law and a mysterious force determined to extinguish them at every turn. They 
eventually discover that they are being hunted by a clandestine pseudo-governmental group called 
the “Organization” (องค์กร). The Organization is headed by four influential individuals working 
in the shadows to gain control over the economic and political affairs of the country.168 
 
Illustration 4.3: Promotional poster for Nuer Mek starring Chakrit Yamnarm as Payu and as Cherry 
Kemapsorn Sirisukha as Fah, Nok Sinjai Plengpanich as Napa and as Too Noppon Gomarachun 
as Meka (Mekin) 
 
These four members of the Organization capitalize on their business networks to engineer 
their rise to the top of the power hierarchy in Thailand. In their quest to expose this group, Payu 
                                                          
168 “Lakorn Nuer Mek [Drama Above the Clouds],” THAITV3, accessed February 15, 2014 
<http://www.thaitv3.com/เรือ่งยอ่ละคร/81/เหนือเมฆ.html>. 
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and Fah are portrayed as vigilant defenders of free will, justice and democracy under threat. In a 
pivotal scene, Payu makes an announcement broadcasted across the capital city to express his 
infuriation with what he sees as a failed system of law and justice: 
“Hello, Thai society that is asleep. I believe that everyone knows my face well. I am Payu 
Tanarath, the accused who is wanted by the state on various charges. I have come here 
today because I wanted to say that it is time for Thai society to wake up. Doesn’t everybody 
know that the chaotic conditions of our country’s economy and society are spun by a single 
group? It is the same group that created the situation to make me a criminal in the eyes of 
society. I had to escape from the crime that I did not commit. But the more I escape, the 
more I know that I will die as a victim. Many innocent people are forced to kill me. They 
have to die because of the evilness of these three people. Therefore, I have had enough 
with needing to escape frantically. From today on, I will not escape anymore. I will rise to 
fight against them. I will tear off their masks so that society will know the truth in order to 
prove my own innocence. And to those three people, guard yourself well. Your karma is 
following you to hunt you down. No matter what, you do not have a way to escape from 
your guilt. It’s your turn to face your karma.”169 
 
 
Illustration 4.4:  Left - The members of The Organization; Right - Payu makes a citywide broadcast 
announcing his retaliation against The Organization 
 
Payu is the whistleblower for the unlawful workings of a megalomaniac group primed to 
govern the affairs of the country without the citizens’ knowledge and consent. The Organization 
includes: Orn In, the director of a national satellite communications company called the Network 
to spy on the activities of TSI, Aisoon, a political businessman and arms dealers and Tawan, 
                                                          
169 Nuer Mek, Episode 11 (My translation). 
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founder of a charitable foundation that secretly kidnaps underprivileged children to generate good 
publicity for his business projects. In the last few episodes, viewers shockingly discover the 
identity of the fourth member of the Organization – Mekin, Meka’s older twin brother, a drug 
addict and felon recruited to disguise himself as Meka. The term nuer mek has a negative meaning 
in the lakorn. It literally translates as above the clouds in the sense of positioning or believing 
oneself to be above the law. Nuer Mek underlines business brokering and political treason as 
deterrents of “true” democracy in Thailand. The institution of law is deficient and susceptible to 
exploitation. In spite of that, good can still prevail as long as there is political accountability from 
legitimate forces of authority. The drama ends with the capture of the original three members of 
the Organization and the death of Mekin by competent police authorities to restore peace and 
stability to Thailand under a steadfast leader. This neat conclusion spells out a clear message: 
evilness cannot exists above the clouds forever because goodness will eventually win out. Nuer 
Mek was a successful drama that wrestled with issues of political legitimacy and transparency 
within the soap genre. Despite its political aims, the soap failed to a reactionary movement from 
the viewers. It was able to evade the censors.  
V for Vendetta  
 Channel 3 took another chance with its venture into political drama more than two years 
later with Nuer Mek 2: Meu Phrap Jom Khamang Waet (เหนือเมฆ2: มอืปราบจอมขมงัเวทย์) directed 
by Nonzee Nimibutr, a film director best known for Nang Nak (นางนาก, 1999). The inclusion of 
sorcerer )ขมงัเวทย์) in the title's subheading indicates that the second installment will integrate 
elements of black magic and wizardry which seemingly suggests its triviality if not political 
neutrality. Set four years after the end of Nuer Mek, the sequel details the tribulations of Meka as 
the elected Prime Minister against a threatening coalition backed by political power, dirty money 
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and incantations. Meka is assisted this time by earnest police lientenent Sengkla, his eccentric 
partner Major Saming, his childhood friend Namsai who is a reporter for SkyNews and Dr. 
Praepailin of the Institute of Forensic Tech. Sengkla and Saming are tasked with recovering the 
four divine weapons believed to give great powers to the one who possesses them all. Their 
investigation is repeatedly hindered by an unidentified cloaked figure whose supernatural abilities 
include dodging bullets, mind control and shape-shifting. As Sangkla and Praepailin try to explain 
the mysterious occurrences through scientific evidence, Saming relies on his knowledge about 
omens, spells, and charms to find who is behind the thefts of the weapons.170 If this was the entire 
synopsis of the drama, it would have flown under the censor radar. The premise of Nuer Mek 2 
remained the same as its predecessor – good versus evil. But this time, the stakes were raised. 
 
Illustration 4.5: Promotional poster for Nuer Mek 2 starring Mark Prin Suparat as Sengkla and 
Mint Chalida Vijitvongtong as Praepailin 
 
 Meka is positioned at the front lines of an internal political war. The evil side is manned 
by Jak, Special Advisor to the Thaiteewat Party, his hired hand, Winyu and an insider, Rawee, 
who is the director of the Special Investigation Unit. Jak holds a personal vendetta aginst Meka 
                                                          
170 Lakorn Nuer Mek 2: Meu Phrap Jom Khamang Waet [Above the Clouds 2: the Conqueror over the Master of 
Sorcery],” THAITV3, accessed February 15, 2014  
<http://www.thaitv3.com/ละคร/199/เหนือเมฆ2-มอืปราบจอมขมงัเวทย์.html#ad-image-0>. 
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whose upright character is a hindrance to his elaborate operation of corruption. When Meka refuses 
to comply, Jak calls on Winyu, a potent sorcerer, to do his bidding. Winyu plots the murder of then 
Deputy Prime Minster Anon. Afterwards, he possesses the minds of high-ranking ministry officials 
to unanimously vote in Jak as the replacement. Once in an advantegous position, Jak abuses his 
powers to push for an auction to aquire new government satellites. The project is framed as an 
investment in the future of the country that would reap benefits for all Thai citizens. But the dirty 
politics is happening on the side. The company locked to win the bid to be the recipient contractor, 
Diamond Karat Network, is selected by Jak himself. In the Council of Ministers meeting, Winyu 
attempts to possess Meka into passing the resolution. Protected from black magic by his strong 
virtue, Meka is unaffected and instead calls for a referendum from the people. Meanwhile, Napa 
is praying at a temple asking that virtue remain a sanctuary and protective armor for those who 
intend to help the country and for wickedness to lose out.171 The demarcation between good and 
evil is now being drawn within government. The character of Meka is no longer fighting just with 
business-minded criminals, but his own kind. 
 
Illustration 4.6: With possession of two of the divine weapons, Winyu (played by Nok Chatchai 
Plengpanich) uses black magic in an attempt to control Meka into approving the satellite project. 
He fails because Meka is protected by a strong, virtuous inner spirit (Episode 6). 
 
                                                          
171 Nuer Mek 2, Episode 6 (2012). 
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 When black magic fails, Jak resorts to assassination. Meka and Napa are gunned down at 
their home but manage to survive the shooting. While rushing to safety, they run into Komsorn, 
Secretary of the Prime Minister, who has come to kill Meka while under the control of Winyu. 
Meka is shot in the chest by Komsorn and falls into a state of coma. Jak visits the hospital to 
confirm Meka's paralysis and rejoices in his defeat of his strongest political enemy. He now has 
the right to act on behalf of the Prime Minister. In a press conference following the news of Meka's 
critical condition, Jak is bombarded with questions concerning his appointment of Winyu as 
secretary and his anulment of the referendum for the satellite project. He is accused of cronyism 
)พวกพอ้ง), conflict of interests (ขดัผลประโยชน์), and abuses of power for his ties to Diamond Karat 
Network and other corporations whose successful bid on several government projects were under 
his stamp of approval. THe villian of the story, is painted as a corrupt, greedy politician who sees 
the game of politics solely as a lucrative business transaction. Nuer Mek 2 bluntly dramatizes the 
myraid illegal maneuverings and machinations involved within Thai politics. 
 
Illustration 4.7: Left – A bitter argument between Meka and Jak over the nature of Thai politics 
(Episode 1); Right – Press conference where Jak (played by Dom Haetrakul) denies charges of 
corruption (Episode 6) 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Guessing Game 
It is hard to miss the satirical tone of Nuer Mek 2. Satire is generally defined as the 
employment of humor, irony, exaggeration, or ridicule to expose and criticize prevailing 
immorality or foolishness. The purpose of satire, in its stress on prevailing vices and follies of a 
particular person or class of people, is to ridicule. 172  Satire “chips at society’s preferred frame and 
exposes the hypocrisy and inequality its master narratives work to conceal.” It gives credence to 
an unorthodox view inviting individuals to reappraise normative experience and question the 
foundations of society’s dominant stories.173 Satire aims to summon its audiences to actively 
scrutinize the ruptures and distortions of lived experience. What exactly was Nuer Mek 2 trying to 
say about the existing conditions of Thai society?  
Nuer Mek 2 depicts the game of politics in Thailand as wrought with discord and vice. The 
heroization of Meka and villianization of Jak is posited on a politicized discursive taxonomy that 
differentiate their actions and principles. In their many quarrels, Meka and Jak express their 
adherence to mutually exclusive political ideologies. Their rivalry is evident from their first 
encounter in the premiere episode. Jak confronts Meka to pressure him into approving a nuclear 
power project. He reminds Meka that the Thaiteewat Party was financially backed with the money 
from his business connections. By extension, Meka's political rise was possible because of the 
support of the business sector. Meka clarifies that his appointment as Prime Minister was based 
on the votes of the citizens; therefore he must honorably carry out his duties to ensure their 
wellbeing. While the world of politics may change with time, Meka insists on the stability of the 
"world of righteousness" in which power should be used to create justice, morality and virtue. In 
                                                          
172 “Satire,” (def. 1a) The Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford English Dictionary, Dec 2013, accessed March 
23, 2014 <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/171207?rskey=Y88bnP&result=1#eid>. 
173 Megan Hill, “Developing a Normative Approach to Political Satire: A Critical Perspective,” International 
Journal of Communication 7 (2013): 328-330. 
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his poorly veiled acts of corruption, the character of Jak epitomizes the figure of the crooked 
politican set on profitting from his position. In his defense of the people's voices, the character of 
Meka exemplifies the figure of the scrupulous, self-sacrificing and resolute politician who 
prioritizes national prosperity and popular demands. The two men's war of words decisively 
establishes the lakorn's political turn from the start. Their policitized rhetoric exposes the potential 
faults within an unchecked Thai politicial system: the pull of party ideology, the influence of 
money and business, and the growing manipulation of the political network. 
On his Facebook page, Thaksin’s son, Panthongtae described the drama as a thinly veiled 
attack on his family.174 For many, Nuer Mek 2 was indeed mocking Thaksin Shinawatra and his 
allies through the character of Jak, an egotistical politician who used money to buy his way into 
politics. Jak abuses his position in political office to implement an elaborate plan to make 
enormous profits by manipulating the allocation of government concessions in favor of his private 
business interests. He and his affiliates spearhead a lucrative government satellite project solely 
for their personal economic benefit. Perhaps it is coincidental that the formation of the Thai Rak 
Thai party was funded by Thaksin and his business associates and that Thaksin specialized in 
selling Shinawatra group’s satellites through deals with government agencies.175 The producers 
could not directly state that Nuer Mek 2 was a satirical piece about Thaksin. But the plotline 
encouraged viewers to participate in this easy guessing game.  
                                                          
174 “Thailand: Thai soap opera turned into political theatrics,” Thai News Service, January 10, 2013. 
The film Shakespeare Must Die (2012) follows “a theatre group in a fictional country resembling Thailand that is 
staging a production of Macbeth, in which an ambitious general murders his way to the Scottish throne.” The character 
named Dear Leader is a dictator who bears a resemblance to former Thai leader Thaksin Shinawatra. The film was 
banned by the censorship board for its anti-monarchical overtones and charged political content that might incite 
rebellious passions.; “Thailand bans Macbeth film Shakespeare Must Die,” The Guardian, April 4, 2012, Accessed 
March 1, 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/04/thailand-bans-macbeth-film>. 
175 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin 2nd ed. (Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 2009) 210-212; 
Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Singapore: Nordic Institute of Asian 
Studies Press, 2005), 212-214. 
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Thaksin wanted to replace “money politics” with “big money politics” by building a “new 
political structure in which power is centralized in a political party financed by big business.”176 
His political network was forged with large conglomerates, political parties, the National 
Assembly, the military and the police, all intricately linked to him and his family. The influence 
and profitability of his network eclipsed that of previous linkages between different sources of 
economic and political power.177 How is this translated in the lakorn? Nuer Mek 2 does not 
endeavor to say that corruption and the presence of business are new additions to Thai politics, but 
rather they have taken new forms. Corruption is no longer conducted through small bribes and 
loose agreements between bureaucracy, businessmen and local politicians. As implied by the term 
nuer mek, the corruption shown in the lakorn has grown into an extremely sophisticated venture 
scheme that is impressive in reach and scale. Ultimately, the lakorn insinuates that immorality is 
accentuated in the current phrase of Thai politics since the system is now alarmingly contaminated 
by a formidable network of greedy corporate poachers. Whether or not this is a satirical 
interpretation of Thaksin’s coupling of power, big business and politics is for viewers to decide. 
Domino Effect 
Nuer Mek 2 debuted on December 4, 2013 and aired nine out of its twelve episodes from 
Friday to Sunday for three weeks. Nuer Mek 2 appeared at that moment to draw no substantial 
public reaction. On the last week of its broadcast, however, Channel 3 posted a cancellation 
announcement which would soon ignite a huge firestorm in news media, social media, and even 
the streets. News of the abrupt axing circulated immediately and so rapidly to the extent that the 
commotion around the ban exceeded the attention paid to the drama before its termination. The 
incident was similar to the case of Sarawat Yai in that the lakorn focuses on the character of Meka 
                                                          
176 Pasuk and Baker, 195-196. 
177 McCargo and Ukrist, 212-214. 
 
 
96 
 
as the honest and revered Prime Minister struggling to rid the Thai government of corrupt 
politicians who are out to exploit the citizens for their own gain. Nonetheless, there was no sense 
of criticism leveled at the lakorn prior to the decision, making its cancellation seem unwarranted 
to viewers. Ironically, it was the unexpected ban that was met with great disapproval by the vast 
public reaction. The aftermath of the ban was ultimately more political than the lakorn itself. 
The loaded timeline of the Nuer Mek 2 incident starts a few days before the now infamous 
Channel 3 announcement. The channel was apparently rushing to edit the remaining three episodes 
into one final episode to be aired that upcoming Friday. Instead, the channel chose to scrap the 
entire finale just a few hours before its scheduled airtime.178 On Friday, January 4, 2013 at 6:30pm, 
the channel aired a message apologizing for their decision to terminate the airing of Nuer Mek 2 
for its inappropriate content. The first episode of Raeng Prathana (แรงปรารถนา - Ch.3, 2013) was 
aired at 8:15pm instead of the tenth episode of Neur Mek 2. Mark Prin, the actor playing Sengkla, 
post a snapshot on Instagram at 9:20pm that with the simple message: It’s okay (ไมเ่ป็นไร). Nok 
Sinjai, the actress playing Napa, followed with an Instagram post of a single white flower blooming 
under the cloudy blue sky with a statement: What happened is not important. What is important is 
what you think about the things that have happened.179 Their vague posts suggest that they were 
sadden by the decision but have accepted it for now.  
The haste of the ban worked to foster suspicions about government interference. The turn 
of events that quickly followed amassed to a scramble by many state actors to deny involvement. 
Suranand Vejjajiva, the Prime Minister's secretary-general insisted that the prime minister had 
nothing to do with this. The Prime Minister’s Office Minister, Varathep Ratanakorn, who oversaw 
                                                          
178 “Politically tinged drama taken off air,” Bangkok Post, January 4, 2013. 
179 “Chong 3 aang ‘Nuer Mek 2’ Nua haa bang ton may mo ock aakaat [Channel 3 claims that some contents of ‘Nuer 
Mek 2’ is not appropriate for airing],” Thairath, January 4, 2013, accessed February 20, 2014 
 <http://www.thairath.co.th/content/ent/317914>. 
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Channel 3's concession, confirmed that there had been no order from the government to end the 
show.180 Pheu Thai Party deputy spokeswomen, Sunisa Lertpakawat, confirmed that the 
government had not intervened in any way and refuted any possibility of an order from an exiled 
ex-prime minister Thaksin. Peerapong Manakit, chairman of NBTC's subcommittee in charge of 
content and program slots, claimed that he was informed by unnamed Channel 3 executives that 
they were concerned that the lakorn might violate Article 37 of the 2008 Radio and Television 
Broadcasting Business Act. He concluded that the scrapping of the soap opera was solely an act 
of self-censorship by the station.181 Channel 3 executives were apprehensive that the political 
overtones of the lakorn would infringe on broadcasting law. But the ambiguity of their explanation 
had triggered a domino effect of denial and responsibility dodging within mere days. 
The hype behind the ban implicated the NBTC in the process. With speculations about the 
hidden agendas of the government in the decision by the channel, the opposition jumped at this 
opening to prolong the criticism hurled at the administration. Chavanond Intarakomalyasut of the 
Democrat Party pushed for an investigation into the cancellation believing that there was surely 
political interference since the lakorn included themes of corruption.182 Mallika Boonmeetrakul, a 
deputy spokesperson for the party, urged the NBTC to examine the last three episodes to clarify 
whether or not certain content really did violate the 2008 Broadcasting Business Act.183 Their call 
for further investigation spun the termination of the lakorn into a sign of the government’s 
“invisible hand.” Then the Thai Constitution Protection Association petitioned the NBTC and the 
Customer Protection Board to force Channel 3 to air the remaining episodes. Srisuwan Janya, 
secretary-general of the association, believed that the termination of the show infringed on the 
                                                          
180 “Govt denies pulling controversial TV show,” The Nation, January 5, 2013. 
181 “Soap opera axing sparks political firestorm,” Bangkok Post, January 6, 2013. 
182 “Political fracas after Thai soap axed,” AFP, January 6, 2013.  
183 “Ire over axing of Nuer Mek 2 continues,” Bangkok Post, January 6, 2013.  
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rights of Thai consumers. If these agencies did not facilitate in meeting their demands within a 
week, the association planned to lodge a complaint to the Central Administrative Court.184 The 
situation had escalated into a complicated argument about freedom of speech, constitutional rights, 
and policy review. The foreclosing of a conclusion to the lakorn generated more of a reaction than 
its complete airing would have.  
Fan Mayhem 
The veil of secrecy was immediately sensed and commented upon by the viewers as well. 
The instantaneous backlash on social media outlets commenced a divided but volatile state of 
online fan mayhem. The series' cancellation drew heavy criticism from many viewers who insisted 
that Channel 3 show the remaining episodes. Some even called for a boycott of the station. Over 
the course of that weekend, several Facebook pages sprung up from supporters of the show. The 
most outspoken page, the "Bring Me Back Nuer Mek 2" Facebook page, gained more than 47,000 
followers within that timeframe.185 On January 7, a group calling themselves Unlimited Hack 
Team managed to break into Channel 3’s official website (www.thaitv3.com) and displayed a 
message on the front page for twenty minutes with a simple question, “Where is my Nuer Mek?”186 
The online reaction was taken to the streets when group of protesters wearing white masks gathered 
in front of Channel 3’s headquarters on Rama IV Road to protest the decision.187 While opinions 
were founded on more hearsay and guesswork than on evidence, they demonstrated the emerging 
                                                          
184 Thanyarat Doksone, “TV Cancellation Causes Uproar: Cancellation Of Mini-Series 'Nua Mek 2' In Thailand 
Sparks Outrage,” Associated Press, January 7, 2013. 
185 Associated Press, January 7, 2013.  
The “Bring Me Back Nuer Mek 2” Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/pages/เอาเหนือเมฆ-2-
กคูนืมา/346010965505832. 
186 “Meu dii haek wep chong 3 thuang ‘Nuer Mek 2’ daan khor ook [Skilled hands hacked the website of Channel 3 
to demand (the airing of) ‘Neur Mek 2’, (MC Dr. Churak) asked for them to go away].” ASTV Manager, January 7, 
2013, accessed February 15, 2014 <http://manager.co.th/Entertainment/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9560000002235>. 
187 “‘Sorayut’ yom aan khaw ‘Nuer Mek 2’ lew lang chong 3 don buk prathuang [‘Sorayut’ agrees to read the news 
about ‘Nuer Mek 2’ after Channel 3 was raided by protesters],” ASTVผูจ้ดัการ, January 13, 2013, accessed February 
15, 2014 < http://manager.co.th/Entertainment/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9560000004752>. 
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implications of television censorship in Thailand. Political criticism was no longer a campaign 
solely waged in academic institutions, courtrooms, and government offices. It was a public and 
publicized movement bolstered by new technologies of information sharing and discussion. 
 
Illustration 4.8: Unlimited Hack Team displays message on main page of Channel 3’s website 
The urgency and necessity of this inspection into Nuer Mek 2’s cancellation reflected in 
the participation of a broad range of actors. Bangkok senator, Rosana Tositrakul, commented on 
her Facebook page that Channel 3 needed to issue a clear explanation for the rush for self-
censorship since she thought the drama was constructive. Supinya Klangnarong, an NBTC 
commissioner, opined via Tweeter (@supinya) that she would table this as a "media freedom 
suppression" issue at the next NBTC meeting.188 Parliamentary opposition leader Abhisit 
Vejjajiva, took to the Twitter (@Abhisit_DP) on January 5 to advise the broadcaster to reconsider. 
“I myself am not a drama viewer, but (the axing the series) is another infringement on people’s 
rights and liberties. I have never seen a drama not finish airing,” he tweeted.189 With the influx of 
                                                          
188 “‘Concern over content’ behind axing of drama,” The Nation, January 6, 2013. 
189 Abhisit Vejjajiva (Abhisit_DP), “I myself am not a drama viewer, but (the axing the series) is another infringement 
on people’s rights and liberties. I have never seen a drama not finish airing.” January 5, 2013, 3:47am. Tweet.  
(https://twitter.com/Abhisit_DP/status/287525831213985792). 
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accusations of political interference in the cryptic axing of the soap, the NBTC as the national 
regulator was obligated to hold an emergency meeting. At a public seminar held at Chulalongkorn 
University’s Communication Arts Faculty on January 10, Supinya clarified her disagreement with 
the unnecessary citing of Article 37. She stated that the NBTC has never used the law to ban any 
media because an over-exercising of the law would create a climate of fear. Her proposal that 
Channel 3 send the remaining episodes to NBTC for review was received with much approval 
from the hundreds of media representatives, students and members of the public in attendance.190 
The proliferation of theories and commentaries about the situation boosted the axing of Nuer Mek 
2 as an internal decision by Channel 3 into a pressing political issue that demanded resolution. 
The fateful meeting did eventually occur. On January 16, the director Nonzee Nimibutr, 
the producer Chatchai Plengpanich (who plays Winyu) and his wife, Sinjai Plengpanich (who 
plays Napa) reported to a joint meeting in front of the Commission for Political Development, 
media journalists and members of the public. They informed those present at the meeting that they 
had sent the entire script of the lakorn to the channel before filming. Their duty was finished once 
they sent in the finished episodes to the channel. Furthermore, they were also oblivious to the real 
cause behind the termination since they were simply informed of the results of the decision.191 
Somrak Narongvichai, a Channel 3 management executive, reminded the NBTC and the media in 
a later meeting on January 23 that the decision to ban the lakorn was within the rights of the station. 
The reason for the lack of a press conference or follow-up statement from the channel was because 
there was no need since the station was following normal protocols.192 This anticlimactic end to 
                                                          
190 Thai News Service, January 10, 2013.  
191 “Thim ngan ‘Nuer Mek 2’ pat nua haa mung kratop kray mung naen kwaam dii-chua [The work team of ‘Nuer 
Mek 2’ denies that the content is aimed at attacking a person, it focuses on good versus evil],” Thairath, January 13, 
2013, accessed February 20, 2014 <http://www.thairath.co.th/content/pol/320594>. 
192 “Chong 3 yan rai bay sang kaan muang baen ‘Nuer Mek 2’ [Channel 3 affirms that there was no political order to 
ban ‘Nuer Mek 2’],” Thairath, January 23, 2013. accessed February 20, 2014  
<http://www.thairath.co.th/content/pol/322056>. 
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the Nuer Mek 2 incident is as unsettled and ambivalent as its start. The strategy of denial and 
claiming or feigning ignorance by those involved in the production mirrors that of government 
officials. In barring content that unmasks the blemishes within the Thai political system from 
airing, supposed self-censorship on the part of Channel 3 exposed the very fault lines that it wanted 
to obscure.  
 
Illustration 4.9: Left - Chatchai (left), Sinjai (middle) and Nonzee (right) giving statements at a 
meeting to investigate the termination of Nuer Mek 2; Right – The NBTC meeting with Channel 
3 executives in attendance to clarify their decision (from Thairath) 
 
The Nuer Mek 2 controversy illustrates how censorship can produce paradoxical and 
adverse effects. The ban of the drama by Channel 3 was an act of deterrence against the imminent 
political repercussions of government disapproval and sanctions if the content was aired and then 
deemed offensive. The scrapping of the lakorn instead politicizes the actions and motives of those 
charged or suspected of culpability. Censorship had ironically, or perhaps strategically, 
transformed the lakorn into a viable medium for both engendering political progress and 
intensifying political fraction. An act of censorship is no longer a series of command and orders 
carried out by state agencies. It is a fluctuating and asymmetrical configuration of business 
interests, political stakes and public demands. A meeting of the minds occurs at the censor 
interface, one in which the parameters and dimensions of this configuration are hashed out.  
 
 
102 
 
Conclusion: Making Conclusions 
The familiar world of soap opera has been traditionally grounded on the naturalization of 
a repertoire of moral values depicted as underpinning social order. Soaps are narratives of the 
“moral occult” in that they create a world in which the “unthinking decision, the chance encounter, 
the accidental occurrence, and the meaningless tragedy all seem connected to some deeper but 
obscure pattern of significance, some hidden moral order.”193 The closed serial soap postpones 
giving out any answers until the end when the resolution brings into view the outline of the 
operative moral or ideological universe. The attenuation of the narrative, its teleological thrust, 
and the privileging of closure invite the viewer to offer or detect a moral to the story.194 The 
narrative build-up of the lakorn allows viewers to anticipate a grand ending in which loose ends 
are neatly tied up within a moral order.  What happens when that grand ending is missing?  
To this day, Nuer Mek 2 never reached a proper conclusion. Did the last three episodes 
incite rebellion? If so, is that even important? The script of these episodes are posted online for 
anybody to read. They are littered with mentions about goodness (ความด)ี and faith (ศรทัธา): 
“Faith is what we call the belief in doing good (deeds). Let us just have the faith to fight 
for justice and righteousness. Goodness will never be extinct. Good people will never 
disappear from society.” 
 
“The concept of faith is cultivated from generation to generation. The values of doing good 
for society must live forever…[Faith will] sustain goodness in society and protect good 
people from the evil doers increasing day by day. The law cannot punish them.” 
 
“[People should] stop respecting those with position and rank, but give importance to 
goodness.” 
 
“We are starting the final war with them. I will prove to those evil people that goodness 
will never die.” 
                                                          
193 Louise Spence, “’They killed off Marlena, but she’s on another show now’: Fantasy, reality, and pleasure in 
watching daytime soap operas,” in To Be Continued…: Soap Operas around the world, ed. Robert C. Allen (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 183. 
194 Robert Allen, “Introduction,” in To Be Continued…: Soap Operas around the world, ed. Robert C. Allen (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 23-24.  
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“The leader cannot just be a talented (skillful) person but must be a good person as well.” 
 
"We all have to realize the value of life. A valuable life is not about dignity, reputation or 
money...but life that is sacrificed to benefit the society and the people around you." 
 
 “No one can escape death. Good people can die but the most important point is that our 
deaths will leave something behind for society.” 
 
“Our nation will live on not because of any one person but because of the faith of every 
person in society to not accept defeat from evil.”195 
 
The political message from the dialogue is once again that good will always triumph over evil. 
Power should not lie in the hands of one person. Thai politics should not be entrusted with those 
whose influence and authority care built on money and deception. Those with true virtue will bring 
morality back to the country by reestablishing a Thai society built on good faith and good deeds. 
The ending is a call for conscious, able-minded individuals to fight against the injustice and 
inequality within a Thai political system tainted by the privileging of material wealth and social 
standing.196 This is the moral resolution intended for Thai audiences to grasp. 
When news of the ban hit the Thai online world, there were rampant speculations that it 
was a thoroughly planned maneuver by key persons responsible for the conception and creation of 
the soap. The prequel was only a moderate success in ratings. Its themes of corporate greed and 
political power-mongering did not produce a reactionary impulse with Thai audiences to rectify 
such failings. Nuer Mek 2 was also about to finish its run without too much fanfare, averaging 
                                                          
195 “Nuer Mek 2:  Meu Praap Jom Khamang Wet [Above the Clouds 2: The Conqueror over the Master of Sorcery],” 
Thairath, February 23, 2014, accessed March 10, 2014 <http://thairath.co.th/ent/novel/AboveTheClouds>.  
Selected quotes from Nuer Mek 2, episode 10-12 (my translation). 
196 Summary of the last three episodes: While Meka is still in a comatose state, Winyu tries to gather all 4 divine 
weapons to cement his mystical powers. Major Saming figures out that Sengkla is the only one capable of stopping 
Winyu since he is a blood descendent of a disciple of this school of sorcery. With her mother captured, Praepailin is 
forced to steal the weapons from the authorities and hand them over to Winyu. Sengkla, Saming, and Napa chase their 
enemies to the storage warehouse where the weapons are stored. A final battle ensues between the two sides. Winyu 
reveals that he is Sengkla’s father! Sengkla defeats Winyu. Jak and Rawee are arrested. Komsorn becomes a rising 
young politician. Meka’s body is sent for cremation at the temple, but the ending leaves room for interpretation as to 
whether or not he is truly dead. Sengkla and Praepailin are reunited. 
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about nine in the ratings. The majority of the plotline that might have linked fictional characters to 
real people already aired in the first nine episodes. If one supposes that there was no political 
interference, why did Channel 3 ban the lakorn at this time? Netizens pointed at the personal 
history between the producer and senior actors of the lakorn. At the first annual Nataraja Awards 
in May 2010, Aof Pongpat (who plays Major Saming) accepted his award with a provocative 
speech declaring his utmost respect and loyalty to the King. His speech brought Chatchai 
Plengpanich (the producer of Nuer Mek 2) to tears. Before their group singing performance, he 
and two other actresses including Nok Sinjai (who plays Napa and is married to Chatchai in real 
life) pledged their allegiance to the King and urged the Thai people to stop fighting.197 Their 
actions were in response to the ongoing protests and the violence of the military crackdown in 
Bangkok. Since these three people were coincidentally abroad at the start of Nuer Mek 2 incident, 
their notable absence fuelled the rumors that the cancellation of Nuer Mek 2 could very well be a 
deliberate attempt to stir up controversy to advance their pro-monarchical political stance.198 
Writing in 1995, Nidhi Eoseewong believed that the success of Thai films at the time 
derived from their compliance with a traditional moral worldview. The moral world constructed 
in cinema was one in which society remains stationary and unchanged. People went to see films 
that they anticipate will not disrupt or transcend the boundaries of this ideal world.199 But political 
satire is supposed to destabilize the ideal. It “unveils the ideal as fantasy created by the constraints 
                                                          
197 ““Dara chuen chom Aof Pongpat san sirasa nii mop hai prajao paen din [Admired star Aof Pongpat declares loyalty 
to the King],” Sanook!, May 17, 2010, accessed April 10, 2014 
 <http://news.sanook.com/932823/ดาราชืน่ชม%20ออ๊ฟ%20พงษ์พฒัน์%20ล ั่นศีรษะน้ีมอบใหพ้ระเจา้แผ่นดนิ/>. 
198 The producer and director of Nuer Mek 2 have announced their plans to make Nuer Mek 3 as a film to be released 
in a year or two. They say that the movie will include most of the main cast, but with an entirely different script. Since 
then, however, there has not been much news about the progress of the project; “‘Nok’ leng tham nang ‘Nuer Mek 3 
[Nok aims to make the film ‘Nuer Mek 3’],”Komchadluek, January 24, 2013, accessed March 1, 2014 
<http://www.komchadluek.net/detail/20130124/150158/นกเล็งท าหนงัเหนือเมฆ3.html#.UQHBgWcWm18>. 
199 Nidhi Eoseewong, “Kwaam lam luk khong ‘nam nao’ nay nang thai [The depth of “rotten waters’ in Thai films],” 
Silapawatthanataam (1995): 53-54. 
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of a particular social system that inevitably marginalizes and debases certain voices by making 
them appear unintelligible against a backdrop of ‘normative reality.’” It seeks to shatter the 
complacency with the current system in an effort to create confusion, even if only momentarily. It 
tests people’s understandings of how the world operates by taunting and provoking them into 
doubt.200 The satire of Nuer Mek 2 aims to bring to the surface the flaws of the political system in 
place. Its challenge to the ideal moral world was evident in its political critique of a corrupt, elitist, 
and money-oriented government run by a few business-minded individuals holding command over 
a formidable political network. Its satire stimulates in its audiences a sense of doubt in the validity 
and legitimacy of the structures commanding their lives. The public outcry over the ban of Nuer 
Mek 2 illustrates that spectators are ready and willing to be thrown into doubt. They no longer wish 
to be in a motionless moral world while society is being remade before their very eyes. 
This chapter details the severest form of censorship – the ban. As a mechanism of 
censorship, the ban can occur before airtime (Tah Du Dao, Thaw Tit Din), almost immediately 
after the start of broadcast (Sarawat Yai), and even near the very end (Nuer Mek 2). This chapter 
introduces censorship as a strategy of evasion and creation of political controversy. This chapter 
also highlights the fact that no single party holds a monopoly over the right to construct and 
deconstruct the moral world of lakorn. The viewing publics of lakorn - both its producers and 
censors, fans and critics, its regular viewers and disinterested onlookers – have a say, role and 
motive in this world-making. Soap conventions say that the narrative trajectory of lakorn world-
making must end with a moral message. But the success of Nuer Mek 2 does not rely on narrative 
closure. It instead establishes a new possibility of political criticism in the (strategic) withholding 
of a moralistic resolution.   
                                                          
200 Hill, 331-332. 
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Conclusion 
Confronting the World of Lakorn:  
Lessons Learned and Dualities Tested  
 
Project Findings  
In the introduction, I briefly answered three main questions: What is the lakorn? What are 
its role in Thai society? What constitutes state censorship? In this conclusion, I answer three more: 
What is the lakorn doing? What are its interventions into Thai society? What constitutes the state 
in censorship? The cases of lakorn censorship presented in this thesis provide rich material for 
investigation. My project confirms the need to study the “parts” of the censor interface free from 
preconceived binary and totalizing frameworks. As a soap opera, the lakorn is often branded as 
frivolous entertainment. In actuality, it can shape Thai society in profound ways. The notion that 
the state is a unified entity operating exclusively through the institution of law to discipline the 
population is also suspect. Finally, the spectators are no longer passive and private consumers, but 
also engaged in public debates. 
Writing on the control technologies of mass media in the United States, Raiford Guins 
asks: Where precisely are “the censor,” the “institution of censorship,” and the “policy” in the 
practices of media regulation? This study of lakorn censorship started out with thinking through 
these same questions. Guins’ effort, however, is not to find the answers to these loaded questions 
but to challenge the very notion of censorship as the direct enforcement of policies of cultural 
regulation by a body of authority. Similar to Kuhn, he contends that media censorship in the U.S. 
for most of the twentieth century was “premised and practiced on the broadcast model of 
communications whereby censorship is said to emanate (down) from specific institutions and 
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governing organizations.”201 Lakorn censorship can surely be examined with this broadcast model 
in mind. The results would be that state censorship does not exist. Censorship practices as 
extensions of official policy leave a paper trail. If one peruses the records of the NBTC, the state 
as an external censor almost never imposes a direct command on lakorn. My study of lakorn 
censorship does not aim to provide an institutional history of the NBTC. The censorship of lakorn 
that I detail leaves little or no trail. I argue instead that it resides in the mindsets, discourses and 
decisions of lakorn spectators – its creators, fans, critics, and casual viewers - who are in 
conversation with state policing bodies over issues of representation. 
Guins argues that “the operations of censorial effects are manifest in new assemblages, 
technologies, practices and processes.” With the growth of new media and our social relations to 
them, censorship ceases to be exclusively the jurisdiction of an official or institute (a censor) as a 
repressive force or centralized entity. He suggests that “the censorial is a daily practice and 
technique of control not necessarily recognized and practiced as censorship.”202 The purpose of 
the lakorn censorial is to covertly inculcate and ingrain into its recipients an aesthetic of meaning-
making that aligns itself, for the most part, with state agenda. For many viewers, the lakorn 
censorial becomes a habitual but unconscious practice and technique of self-imposed control not 
easily recognized and practiced as censorship. As a result, it is easy to dismiss the state as not 
foundational to the making of the censorial. I argue instead that the act of (self-)censorship is 
embedded in and interactive with existing gender, religious, social, cultural, and political 
conventions and standards. In this regard, the state always figures into the censorship process as 
the creator, defender and benefiter of these standards. 
                                                          
201 Raiford Guins, Edited Clean Version: Technology and Culture of Control, (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009), 183. 
202 Guins, xvi-xviii. 
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This study discovers however that censorship is neither coherent nor entirely effective. 
Censorship does not always appear as coercive and brute force, but also discursive and ideological 
power. At the censor interface, relations, subjectivities and priorities are being negotiated, not just 
laws. Censorship calls into question the assumed nature and hierarchy of the relationship between 
the Thai state, television producers and spectators. Censorship of lakorn neither starts nor ends 
with an absolute decision by the Thai state to obligate a reconfiguration of spectator expectations. 
Rather, the censor interface serves as a space for individuals, interests groups, and fan communities 
to demand a reconfiguration of state tactics and involvement. Censorship as an apparatus of social 
control consists of multifarious “cultural practices that, while not necessarily directly expressive 
of policy or legislation, persist to structure an equally viable component of governance and mark 
an expansion in how governing functions through culture.”203 The productive power of censorship 
can be located in the work that it does to connect popular culture and state control, making them 
mutually constitutive and interdependent. This study contends that the forces and outcomes of 
censorship are engendered by and in turn, engendering new structures of powers, configurations 
of social demands, and assemblies of viewers. 
As May Adadol writes about cinema,  the “embodied potency and communicability of film 
(in its cognitive, sensorial, and affective dimensions), combined with its technological capacity 
and historical conditions of exhibition, carry the potential to configure symbolic public spheres 
that recognize experiences ignored or rendered invisible in official spheres of exchange and 
representation.” Cinema within this framework serves as an alternative public sphere.204 In contrast 
to the theater projection of film and even the limited screening of independent films or 
                                                          
203 Guins, xvii. 
204 May Adadol, “Introduction,” in Glimpses of Freedom: Independent Cinema in Southeast Asia, ed. May Adadol 
Ingawanij and Benjamin McKay (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2012), 8-9.  
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documentaries, the serial temporality of lakorn inherently produces different viewing practices in 
its audiences. Having to catch their soaps at the same time day in and day out, regular viewers are 
pushed to consume lakorn in a routine fashion and usually within private spaces. The conflation 
of the fictional and the real is habitualized and intensified in lakorn spectatorship. Lakorn does not 
serve as an alternative public sphere but as the public and private in one. Instead of creating an 
alternative public platform for off-screen experiences previously invisible or marginal, lakorn 
encourages the privatization and personalization of on-screen experiences that are highly 
accessible and mainstream. 
As a result, it would be misleading to group lakorn censorship under film censorship even 
if both are mediums of visual representations. Whereas the new Cinema and Video Act authorizes 
film censorship prior to theatrical release, lakorn censorship does not operate in this mode. Who 
censors, how to censor, and when to censor are questions asked throughout lakorn production and 
broadcast. Due to its serial programming, it is not too late to censor a lakorn in the middle of its 
airing. Moreover, censorship is not a decision handed down by a board but an ongoing dialogue in 
which concessions, compromises, and collaborations are made. In other words, it is a negotiable 
process rather than a definitive judgment or protocol. While the mechanisms (sanctions for taboo 
topics, blurring images, muting sounds, running disclaimers, forced edits, and the ban) may be 
similar to film censorship, its temporality is not. I argue against examining only the final means of 
lakorn censorship since it misses the intangible forms, mediated character, dispersed timing and 
after effects of censorship. 
Twin Vengeance 
Why should we watch lakorn? Apart from being thrilling and addictive, lakorn is powerful 
and productive. Its power lies in its capability to infiltrate many aspects of Thai modern life. 
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Lakorn consumption is an enriching experience wherein viewers “come to see themselves in 
relationship to the world.” Lakorn provides viewers with “pleasure and comfort in a world that, 
for many Thais, is increasingly fragmented, unpredictable, and insecure.” The lakorn plays an 
active role in alleviating, reflecting and producing these tensions.205 Therefore, the lakorn is no 
longer merely an imaginary space to which viewers momentarily escape. The lakorn serves as a 
viable means to discuss real issues and real experiences. It is an interactive space where viewers 
can decipher, question, reconfigure, but also reaffirm the conventions of Thai gender politics, 
governmental politics and the politics of everyday life. Raeng Ngao (แรงเงา – Ch.3, 2012) is the 
perfect example of how the multiple processes of world-making, identity-making, meaning-
making, and claim-making are simultaneously at play through the lakorn. 
When Raeng Ngao burst onto the scene, Thai audiences were once again captivated by the 
spectacle of backstabbing and catfights among the female characters. This drama was a remake of 
a popular story about vengeance, deception, forgiveness and of course, true love. Set in a Thai 
ministry office in Bangkok, Raeng Ngao first follows Mutta, a polite, gentle and diligent woman 
working under the head director, Pope. Even though married with three children, Pope is a serial 
adulterer who soon sets his sights on Mutta as the next target in his string of extramarital affairs. 
In his scheme to win her heart, he lies to Mutta that he is separated and will soon divorce his wife, 
Napa. Mutta falls for his fabrications and hopes to build a future with him. Mutta also grows close 
to the gentlemanly Weekit at work. Weekit, Pope’s blood nephew, is interested in Mutta as well 
but loses to his uncle’s practiced womanizing ways. When Napa hears news of Pope’s infidelity, 
she insults and attacks Mutta at the ministry for being gullible and sexually indiscriminate. Napa’s 
spiteful tantrum, characteristic of her narcissism and elitism, was recorded by other employees in 
                                                          
205 Sara Van Fleet, “Everyday Dramas; Television and Modern Thai Women” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 
1998), 5-6.  
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the office building to be publicized and disseminated online for all to see. The disgrace and 
indignity of being labeled a shameless mistress drives Mutta to commit suicide alongside her 
unborn child by Pope.206 Within the first few episodes, viewers catch glimpses of the underlying 
moral messages of the lakorn: the need to preserve the sanctity of marriage, the importance of 
family, and the pitfalls of egotism. But the remake of this beloved story added some contemporary 
caveats by exploring the dangers of rumors and secrets in a defamatory culture, the decline of 
personal privacy and the destructive uses of modern technology.207 
The tragedy of Mutta’s death set the stage for the ruthless game of revenge enacted by none 
other than Mutta’s older twin sister, Munin. The lakorn took a turn into the dark side with her 
highly anticipated appearance. Munin is a confident and capable woman who graduated with a 
Master’s degree from New York University. She works to support her family at a major computer 
company in the U.S. Mutta’s suicide taints her return to Thailand after years abroad. Before 
reporting to work at the Bangkok branch, Munin decides to exact coldblooded revenge on those 
who harmed Mutta by disguising herself as her younger twin sister and wreaking havoc on their 
lives. Munin’s retaliation begins when she is confronted by Napa in the same staircase at the 
ministry where Mutta had previously faced humiliation. In this reprise scene, it is Munin, 
masquerading as Mutta, who slights Napa in front of crowd that gathered. This particular scene 
instantly became the talk of the town as online and media commentary relished the wicked 
grandeur of Munin’s awaited vengeance. This familiar story of a resilient, independent and 
                                                          
206 “Lakorn Raeng Ngao [Drama Heated Shadow],” THAITV3, accessed March 1, 2014 
<http://www.thaitv3.com/ละคร/192/แรงเงา.html#ad-image-0>. 
207 For more on defamatory culture, see David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason, and Lèse-
Majesté (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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educated woman settling the score gained great traction with domestic audiences. Throughout the 
course of its run in late 2012, Raeng Ngao raked in phenomenal ratings, peaking at 16.  
 
Illustration 5.1: Left - Promotional poster for Raeng Ngao which stars Janie Tienphosuwan as 
Munin/Mutta, Pip Rawit Terdwong as Pope and Ken Phupoom Phongpanu as Weekit;  
Right – Munin’s first encounter with Napa disguised as her twin 
 
Many Thai viewers participated in this kind of progressive reading of the character of 
Munin. Citing her assertiveness and aggressive as non-normative traits, they interpreted her as a 
role model figure. Surprisingly and perhaps inadequately informed by feminist discourses, these 
interpretations transformed Munin into a champion of women’s rights. Can an attractive corporate 
executive by day, devious vixen by night challenge Thai gender, social, cultural and moral norms? 
Driven by a strong resolve, Munin took it upon herself to enforce justice. She transcends the image 
of the meek, docile Thai woman espoused by her twin sister. At the same time, Munin seduces 
Pope by donning racy outfits and heavy make-up. She purposely taunts and provokes Napa about 
her husband’s infidelities. Munin’s revenge is achieved at the expense of their family. Oddly 
enough, she is at once a feminist and femme fatale. A lakorn character had become a challenger 
of Thai conventions of feminine beauty and female agency. Munin was the indicator and tester of 
changing perspectives on the role of modern Thai women. 
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Because of this, the state had to come in to demystify this bewildering and contradictory 
appraisal of the character. Complaints about the forceful tone and inappropriate content in Raeng 
Ngao were filed directly with the Ministry of Culture and NBTC, through social media, and on 
entertainment news since the start of its run. The NBTC had to force Channel 3 to assign an 18+ 
rating. When this action was not enough to calm the criticism, the NBTC had to call a meeting to 
initiate an open discussion on what to do about the rest of the lakorn set to air. In the end, the 
lakorn was able to complete its run after some scene edits and lines of dialogue voided of sound.208 
With mounting grievances, the NBTC was obliged to come in and conduct a thorough evaluation 
of Raeng Ngao, similar to the scenarios mentioned in Chapter 3. This incident illustrates how state 
bodies do not follow a set protocol for every case. This pattern suggests that censorship is still very 
much a state mediation of a diverse and divided multitude of voices. While state policing bodies 
may be the delegated enforcer of varying forms and degrees of external censorship, the censor 
interface allows for relations to be negotiated, demands to be uttered, and compromises to be 
reached.  
Worlds Collide 
 What could be real is in theory interpreted and presented in and as lakorn. But what 
happens when lakorn is interpreted as real? What happens when it becomes real? At the 4th 
Nataraja Awards on May 19, 2013, Tanyares Ramnarong won the award for best supporting actress 
in television for her portrayal of Napa in Raeng Ngao. In her acceptance speech, she thanked her 
husband Peck Sanchai Engtrakul. This gesture on stage was in no way meant as a token of marital 
bliss. Tanya thanked her husband for giving her the experience of being mia luang (head wife) to 
                                                          
208 “Wor Tor raai amnat sop nua haa Raeng Ngao song tor NBTC pijarana [The Ministry of Culture lacks the power 
to evaluate the content of Raeng Ngao and forwards the case to the NBTC for consideration],” Kapook!, accessed 
April 1, 2014 <http://drama.kapook.com/view49736.html>. 
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sufficiently relay the crazed emotions of Napa on screen. This got a sizable cheer from the audience 
in the theatre and probably at home who are well aware of her ongoing feud with Pinky Savika, 
her husband’s mia noi (mistress).209 Much like her character, Tanya was engaged in a bitter real-
life quarrel with “the other woman” that included such ploys as secretly recording their phone 
conversations (read confrontations) and leaking private texts between Pinky and her husband to 
the tabloids. Her thank-you message was a veiled declaration of victory and a performance in itself. 
She was acting out her role as the legitimate wedded wife beyond the small screen. This merging 
of the world of lakorn and reality happened in the most “spectacular” of ways. 
 
Illustration 5.2:  Both Tanya (left) and Pinky (right) were nominated for best supporting actress at 
the 4th Nataraja Awards 
 
Then, in the summer of 2013 while studying in Thailand, I was asked by my oblivious 
colleagues why the gossip around actress Janie Tienphosuwan, who played Mutta and Munin in 
Raeng Ngao, was suddenly on the front pages of the newspapers even as Thailand was still 
                                                          
209 “‘Tanya’ phak khop khun ‘Pek’ thii tham hai in bot mia luang [Tanya thanks Pek for helping her get into the role 
of the head wife],” Thairath, May 20, 2013, accessed April 1, 2013 <https://www.thairath.co.th/content/ent/345800>.  
At the same award show, Raeng Ngao took home an award for best director, best cast and best supporting actor to 
‘Pip’ Ravit Terdwong for his portrayal of Pope. 
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investigating a major religious scandal revolving around the dubious actions of a millionaire monk. 
It seemed at the time that an entertainment scandal rocked the Thai public more than the one that 
rattled the Thai Sangha. As the resident lakorn and Thai pop culture expert, I had to explain why 
this seemingly simple story of her marriage exploded in the press. On August 8th, Janie organized 
a press conference to announce her sudden marriage to Ae Chonsawat Asavahame, a high-profile 
politician. During their interview, the pair disclosed that they had gone to legally register their 
marriage at 9 a.m. that very morning. Apart from flaunting their rings and marriage certificate to 
the dozens of journalists present, the couple showed a copy of Janie’s recent pregnancy 
examination proving that this was not a shotgun wedding but “true love.”210 Like a scene out of a 
lakorn nam nao, the whole press conference appeared so amusing, orchestrated, and sensational.  
Indeed, this was no ordinary marriage. It was a riveting account of how the two worlds of 
lakorn and celebrity lives can collide. Ae happened to have a wife, country singer Nantida 
Kaewbuasai, and an 18-year-old daughter with her. However, he affirmed that their marriage was 
not legal and they have been living apart for 10 years. The tabloid press had been following his 5-
month courtship of Janie, intermittently releasing leaked photos of the pair. Janie had previously 
denied a relationship with Ae.211 With their romance on open display at the press conference, 
however, it was impossible to stop the comparisons between Janie and her lakorn character. Janie’s 
alleged affair with Ae bore an uncanny resemblance to Munin’s rendezvous with the married Pope. 
Amazingly, this carefully staged moment represents (real) life imitating (lakorn) art through 
(media) spectacle. More precisely, it was the blurring of the boundaries between real world and 
lakorn world, publicity and personal life and public discourse and private consumption. 
                                                          
210 “Aung! ‘Ae’ klaeng teang ‘Janie’ puey yaek kap ‘Tu’ 10 pii-mai keuy jot thabian [Quiet! ‘Ae’ announces his 
marriage to ‘Janie’ and reveals that he has split with ‘Tu’ and that in their 10 years together, he did not register the 
marriage],” Thairath, August 8, 2013, accessed April 1, 2014 <http://www.thairath.co.th/content/ent/362260>. 
211 “Wealthy political marries leading actress,” Bangkok Post, August 8, 2013. 
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Illustration 5.3: Janie’s press conference announcing her marriage to Ae (from Kapook!) 
 
Raeng Ngao ushered in a new era of lakorn spectatorship in Thailand. The life of the lakorn 
does not end when it has finished airing. Lakorn can go on to encompass real life. Spectatorship 
extends beyond the home and beyond the “text” of lakorn. Raeng Ngao proves that Thai soap 
spectatorship does not avoid thinking too much about the lakorn, but is instead actively and 
seriously engaged in a close “reading” of the lakorn. In this reading of the lakorn, spectators 
generates new critical discourses (reevaluating gender norms), social relations (celebrity aiding 
gossip tabloids), creative interpretations (Munin as feminist) and fascinating reimaginings (real 
life mimicking lakorn). The world of lakorn offers us a glimpse into the many unexpected ways 
in which contemporary Thai society is reinventing itself. Rather than lakorn having to adjust to 
the bounds of censorship, the censor interface must now work hard to keep pace with the lakorn. 
Conclusion: Lakorn Studies 
Television was introduced in 1999 to Bhutan, the only country left on earth that did not 
have access at the time. From that moment on, television has reached universal accessibility. 
Television both showcases and shapes contemporary life across the political, social and cultural 
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spectrum. But is TV true? Is TV beautiful? What can TV be?212 The Frankfurt School in the 1930s 
developed a critical approach to communication studies which applied critical social theory to the 
study of mass-mediated culture and communications. These scholars recognized emerging 
“culture industries” (popular music, television, popular literature, magazines, radio soaps, and 
even horoscopes) as more than a form of leisure activity but as “important agents of socialization, 
mediators of political reality, and productive institutions of contemporary societies.”213 My study 
understands the lakorn as a viable and valuable medium through which to address and reflect upon 
social problems that are otherwise sidestepped. Everyday viewers can access the lakorn as a 
reference point for contemporary debates on issues such as constitutional rights, freedom of 
speech, religious authenticity, gender politics, political reform, national identity and morality. 
Lakorn therefore can be many things: entertainer, educator, advocate, instigator, investigator and 
troublemaker. 
I participate in an emergent field called lakorn studies. My study of lakorn and the lakorn 
itself complicates the divide between reality and fiction, public and private, fan and critic, and 
prohibition and self-regulation. This project is also at an interface:  
On one hand, studies of how ‘we’ (intellectuals) consume culture have worked on the 
assumption that readers actively make interpretations, drawing on a detailed set of already 
held knowledge about similar texts, previous great works and other forms of cultural 
capital…On the other hand, studies of how ‘they’ (the masses) consume culture have, for 
much of the century, assumed that these readers do not do any work interpreting the texts. 
Rather, in some way, they have ideas put straight into their brains.214 
 
Nonetheless, Alan McKee reminds us that how work on fan audiences debunks the distinction 
between scholarly processes of interpretation and fannish ways of making meaning. We need to 
                                                          
212 John Hartley, “Television Truths: Argumentation of TV,” Television Truths (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2008), 1, 9-10.  
213 Douglas Kellner, “Television and the Frankfurt School,” in Television Studies, ed, Toby Miller (London: British 
Film Institute, 2002), 17-18.  
214 Alan McKee, “Fandom,” in Television Studies, ed, Toby Miller (London: British Film Institute, 2002), 66-67. 
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note the ontological similarity between academics and fans because both “view” and engage with 
the television texts at hand.215 Perhaps my position as both a researcher and fan of lakorn is a 
blessing in disguise. My venture into analyzing the censorship of the lakorn is to explore what 
stories can and cannot be told and why. Thus, this entire study is an interpretative story of a curated 
story. As a story of a story, it nevertheless was able to pose many questions, some left unanswered. 
But just as the Thai lakorn censor interface is plagued with ambivalence and contradiction, I too 
will embrace the sense of ambiguity and uncertainty because it is just more fun that way. 
 
  
                                                          
215 McKee, 69. 
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